TNAG-1279-FCO40-1630-Repatriation-of-Vietnamese-refugees-from-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 39

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6. It is also important that we maintain the best possible relations between ourselves and Hong Kong, particularly while we are involved in delicate negotiations over the future of the territory. Our credib- ility with the Executive Council and that of the Governor as an effec- tive advocate of their interests could be critically affected by this case. We particularly need to be helpful in the light of the recent refusal by the Home Secretary to increase significantly the very small numbers of Vietnamese refugees now allowed into the United Kingdom. Althouth I well understand the reason for it, this refusal must seem unreasonable to EXCO while we apparently expect Hong Kong to bear an indefinite burden. Therefore, despite the difficulties that Mr Pike has pointed out, and recognising that the chances of success are small, I recommend that he should be instructed to approach the Vietnamese Government again about repatriation.

Action with UNHCR and Public Line

7.

In making this recommendation I recognise that we need to consider carefully how to handle the UNHCR and public opinion. We have hitherto accepted the view that all boat people should be treated as refugees and that UNHCR should take the lead in arranging their resettlement from places of first asylum, such as Hong Kong. It would be important to let UNHCR know in advance that we intended to approach the Vietnamese, while emphasising that we had not yet taken any decision

on repatriation.

8. Public and parliamentary opinion might well be suspicious if such an approach became known. Many people would argue that any fugitive from Vietnam was ipso facto a refugee. They might be surprised that we were apparently prepared to consider accepting assurances from the Vietnamese.

We could however counter by saying that:

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we were talking to the Vietnamese about a range of problems concerning refugees;

we were making no commitments at this stage. We wished to remain flexible in order to deal in the most reasonable way with problems created by Vietnamese refugees;

there would in any case be no question of involuntary repatri- ation without firm and satisfactory guarantees being obtained;

we would of course only consider repatriating those who did not qualify for refugee status under the terms of the 1951 Convention.

I attach a draft telegram of instructions for your consideration.

Fol Belstead.

21 March 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

(BELSTEAD)