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been agreed that all Sino-Vietnamese were presumed to have "well-founded fears").
More interestingly, he did say that he hoped the US would maintain their present level of off-take. He recognised Hong Kong's problem with arrivals from North Vietnam, and hoped other countries with more flexible admission criteria could be persuaded to take these (he mentioned Canada and Australia). On voluntary repatriation, he agreed that very few boat people would want to go back to Vietnam. Nevertheless, the US believed that it was a fundamental principle that people should be allowed to return to their own country if they wished, and would therefore continue to urge the UNHCR to press the Vietnamese on this, however slim the chances seemed of making any real progress. of all the boat people, he thought North Vietnamese in Hong Kong the most likely to be permitted to go back.
6. Funseth also expressed the view that in the short term (he specified 2-3 years) the priority should be to do everything possible to discourage departures from Vietnam. This was already being done in many ways, for example the introduction of the closed centre policy in Hong Kong and the refusal by the US to look at priority 6 cases (which they were doing all they could to publicise in Vietnam). Efforts to encourage voluntary repatriation would also help here. During this period resettlement should continue at about the present level, to reduce existing camp populations but without attracting more departures. At some point it would be necessary to address the question of those left behind in camps. He believed that most ASEAN countries accepted this scenario, and therefore that they should not expect resettlement levels to increase significantly in the short-term. The US had given no specific assurances to them that first asylum countries would not get left with the residue, but Funseth accepted that the US would have to take the lead in dealing with those who had been denied admission to resettlement countries.
7. We shall ourselves be giving careful consideration over the next few weeks as to where we go from here, in the light of the Honolulu meeting and discussions among resettlement states at Geneva, (Funseth did not say when any follow-up meeting might be arranged, but the Americans do seem to accept that more work should be done at official level in Geneva before they can go ahead with a further conferrence which might include ASEA$states as well). When we have something on paper, we shall of course consult you, but in the meantime any thoughts that you may have on this, or on Funseth's remarks, would be welcome.
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CC: CM J Segar Esq, SEAD, FCO
Ms H Yu, HKGO, London
CONFIDENTIAL
RJ F Hoare
Hong Kong Department
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