TNAG-1274-FCO40-1624-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 249

A,B

CONFIDENTIAL

8. As an alternative our posts in Washington, Paris, Ottawa and

Canberra were instructed to approach their Governments (a) to

seek their views on the merits of a joint approach to the

Vietnamese to urge them to step up the Orderly Departure

Programme (ODP) from Vietnam under UNHCR auspices and (b) to

ask them to take more refugees from Hong Kong for resettlement.

UKMis Geneva was instructed to approach the UNHCR for support.

(FCO telegram number 125 to UKMis Geneva and 770 to Washington.)

C,D,E,F 9. We have now received replies to these telegrams. None of

the Governments approached were very receptive to the proposal

that they should accept more Vietnamese refugees, and only the

Australians expressed interest in the idea of a multilateral

approach to the Vietnamese. The UNHCR want to help, but are

pessimistic about the possibilities for resettlement.

G

C

10 . An approach to the Vietnamese Government is unlikely to be worthwhile without wide support. The Americans think that in

the end Hong Kong's problem may have to be solved by an element

of "safe repatriation" under UNHCR auspices (paragraph 3 of

Washington telegram number 1408). However UNHCR will hardly

consider "safe repatiation" without adequate guarantees from the

Vietnamese authorities on the treatment of returning refugees.

11. If the UNHCR think that guarantees could be obtained, We should ask them to approach the Vietnamese authorities. If

however they consider that the Vietnamese authorities would not

give worthwhile assurances, we should ask the UNHCR to state formally that all boat-people should be regarded as refugees because of the risk of persecution if they returned. It would then be easier to press resettlement countries, especially the US, to stop distinguishing between refugees and "economic

migrants".

30 June 1983

Retinofface

Rp. R D Clift

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG DEPARTMENT