TNAG-1273-FCO40-1623-Vietnamese-refugees-in-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 96

CONFIDENTIAL

PS/Lord Belstead

cc: Mr Donald

Mr Williams, UND

Mr Burns, SEAD

Mr Burrows, Legal Advisers

VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG

1.

(20

PA HKK 243/1

33

See

a

1217 P

HKK 2431

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

033

DESK OFFICER INDEX

PÅ

↑

REGISTRY

Action Taken

AF27/4

Your minute of 11 April recorded Lord Belstead's agreement to the proposals in my submission of 8 April.

2.

29

I submit a draft minute to Lord Belstead to send to the Secretary of State, together with draft telegrams to be sent to UKMIS Geneva and to Washington, Paris, Ottawa and Canberra following the Secretary of State's meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on 14 April.

3.

As noted in my submission of 8 April, I told the Governor of Hong Kong what we were proposing. We have now received Hong Kong telno 485, in which he agrees that it would be difficult to justify turning boats away and that we should pursue the idea of a multilateral approach (also involving the Canadians). However, he has expressed the view that it would not be enough simply to point out the problems and advocate greater use of the Orderly Departure Programme, and has suggested that the approach should be designed to open up once again the whole problem of how to discourage the exodus from Vietnam.

4. There are difficulties in this. To urge the Vietnamese to take steps to prevent would-be refugees from leaving would make us open to criticism that we were encouraging increased repression. We would have to consider whether this would be consistent with our human rights obligations. In any case, on general humanitarian grounds, it would be difficult to defend politically, given the repressive nature of the Vietnamese regime.

5. However, we could say that Hong Kong (and the other countries of the first asylum as appropriate) could not take any more. It was essential to ensure that people left Vietnam not by this backdoor method but through the Orderly Departures Programme. I am sure the Vietnamese would get the message. Indeed, there is evidence that they are seriously worried about departures and they may well now be making greater efforts to curb them, although it will only really be possible to judge this later in the year. I think that this line, though not going as far as the Governor would like, should enable him to convince EXCO that a significant effort was being made.

12 April 1983

Quin

R D Clift

Hong Kong and General Department

CONFIDENTIAL