MKK040/23
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
2 2 DEC 1983
DESK OFFICER
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MR DONALD-
GREEARD
PRIVATE SECRETARY
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e letter
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SIR P CRADOCK'S DESPATCH
?
FROM: RD CLIFT
DATE: 16 December 1983
CC
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Sir I Sinclair
Mr Giffard
Mr Burrows
Head, FED
Head, Planning Staff
Head, PUSD
Mr Walker, Research
Mr O'Neill, Assessments Staff
Cabinet Office
Mr. Donald
12 DECEMBER ON THE HONG KONG NEGOTIATIONS
summary,
1. I attach a despatch by Sir P Cradock, together with a on the Hong Kong negotiations. just before Christmas.
Sir P Cradock will be leaving Peking
summary
2. The despatch is something of a tour de force. In the first 9 paragraphs the Ambassador sets out clearly and concisely a of the developments in the talks SO far. He goes on to describe and explain the Chinese attitude, including the stand taken by China's leaders, particularly Deng Xiaoping, and the Taiwan factor. In paragraph 13 he comments on Chinese propaganda and public statements.
3.
Although paragraph 14 comes under the heading of The Chinese Attitude it summarises not only the cards held by China but also the positive points in our own negotiating position although the Ambassador points out that it would be unwise to set the value of the latter too high.
4. The despatch goes on to describe the present position in the talks following the last round on 7 and 8 December. While there has at least been some detailed discussion it is not clear how far the Chinese are prepared to modify their plans for Hong Kong. The Ambassador attaches importance (in para 17) to
to the development between now and 1997 of self-rule in Hong Kong. is a difficult issue. Ministers are already focussing on it.
This
The Governor, who has been asked to prepare a paper on this may
well comment.
look at
5. In paragraphs 18-23 the Ambassador takes а realistic the difficulties facing us, both in the talks themselves and in reaching an acceptable agreement. He believes that we shall have to choose essentially between full scale confrontation (or variants of it), which could cause Hong Kong to become ungovernable before 1997, and making the Chinese plan as tolerable as possible by seeking maximum autonomy maximum continuity and maximum guarantees
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