three
6.
After a few further brisk exchanges, I suggested that Adley might come in to see me again. In discussing possible times, Adley mentioned that he had some important meetings the next day: one with the Jordanian Embassy
(apparently he is also Chairman of the Anglo/Jordanian Group in the House of Commons), and the other, an "important meeting" with the Chinese Ambassador at 10.30 a.m. On the basis of that I arranged to see him at 9.30 this morning.
7.
Soon after Adley left my Office, I informed Dick Clift very briefly of the above and, in particular, of Mr. Adley's claim to be shuttling back and forth between the FCO and the Chinese Embassy. Dick undertook to make enquiries to see whether there was any truth in this. I also suggested to Dick that it may be significant that Adley had been called to the Chinese Embassy for a meeting at 10.30 a.m. by which time presumably news might have been received of the outcome of the Fourth Round of Talks in Peking.
8.
This morning Mr. Adley came in to see me (early) at about 9.15 a.m. We went substantially over the same ground we had gone over before (i.e. during yesterday's telephone conversation and during my previous meeting with him on 21 July). Adley was adamant that he had to inform Hong Kong people of their stupidity in not recognising the facts of life. I asked him what or who on earth had given him this mission: his business interests were clearly not great in Hong Kong and it was patently obvious that he knew very little of Hong Kong and virtually nothing of Hong Kong people's wishes.
9.
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Rather blandly, he said, "Good question perhaps I see myself as a maverick independent Conservative MP in the mould of Winston Churchill: he felt it necessary to speak out against Hitler in the early thirties." I said that this really was nonsense to think of himself in these terms, that the analogy was clearly completely false and irrelevant. I then went on
to say that, as far as Hong Kong is concerned, the British and Chinese were in negotiation: there had been a firm undertaking by the Prime Minister of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the effect that the talks should remain confidential. I went on to say that the best possible thing would be for people like Adley simply to keep quiet and allow the negotiators to do their job. He said he did not see his role in this way and that it was quite clear to him that Hong Kong people (perhaps encouraged by the Taiwanese) were insulting China and the Chinese leadership; as far as he was concerned the important thing was that no matter what happened over Hong Kong, Sino/British relationships should not be impaired. I suggested that surely
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