TNAG-1259-FCO40-1599-The-Future-of-Hong-Kong---special-study-by-FCO--August-1982--1983 — Page 198

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39. There will almost certainly be a wide gap between the

positions of the two sides. This is likely to be reflected in

seriously divergent views on the purpose of follow up talks.

On our side we will want talks about arrangements for the

continuation of British administration. To that end the Prime

Minister may wish to propose the early start of discussions

through diplomatic channels aimed at reaching agreement on

mutually acceptable arrangements for the future. For their part,

the Chinese will no doubt want talks directed to the modalities

of resumption of sovereignty probably involving a transition

to Special Administrative Region status. They may well push hard

for this.

40. The Prime Minister will not wish to agree that the Chinese

position should be accepted as the basis on which future talks

should be conducted; nor will she wish to make any substantive

concession on sovereignty without a clear indication from the

Chinese that they would be prepared in return to contemplate

the continuation of British administration after 1997. In order

to avoid an impasse it is for consideration whether the Prime

Minister should indicate willingness in the course of talks,

without prejudice to the positions of either side, to discuss

ways in which the Chinese position on sovereignty might be

protected, provided this was on the strict understanding that

in return the Chinese were prepared to accept that no changes

should be made in present arrangements for administering the

territory for a long time to come. Depending on the course of

the discussions, the Prime Minister might go further and hint at

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/willingness