TNAG-1259-FCO40-1599-The-Future-of-Hong-Kong---special-study-by-FCO--August-1982--1983 — Page 127

retained responsibility for external affairs and defence,

the position of the Garrison would be easier to justify in

the UK and internationally, notwithstanding that the traditional

threat from China had been removed. If however HMG exercised

responsibility only for local administration including law

and internal security, the position of the Garrison would

be more anomalous. In either case, but particularly in the

latter we should need to consider carefully

(a)

the role of the Garrison;

(b)

its command and control;

(c)

its financing,

and to reach clear agreement with the PRC on such matters.

This would be difficult.

8.

There must be real doubt whether the Chinese would

be able to accept a continuing British military presence.

They might suggest that Chinese forces should replace or

supplement British ones. A substantial and permanent PLA

presence would raise major difficulties and be hard to

reconcile with British administration. Special arrangements

}

for Chinese visiting forces might however be negotiable.

Regular liaison arrangements, possibly including the

stationing in Hong Kong of a Chinese liaison officer, might

prove a way of soothing some PRC susceptibilities.

4

/Hong