TNAG-1258-FCO40-1591-Third-countries-and-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1984 — Page 78

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arrangements we managed to put over some of detailed material and to

press for pragmatic consideration of specific areas of

administration. We also made major effort to dispel evident Chinese doubts about our motives. At November round and subsequently

through informal contacts between negotiatiors we have reiterated (a) that we are sincerely prepared to examine without prejudice to the eventual outcome or to our position whether arrangements to ensure Hong Kong's stability and prosperity could be built on

Chinese proposals; (b) that we do not envisage co-administration of

Hong Kong but would see our role in terms of assistance to promote

its development.

7. At next round (7-8 December) should be able to guage both impact of and Chinese willingness to move forward on detail.

Depending on Chinese reaction may subsequently need clarification of

our motives in to reassess our strategy. Close consultation with

EXCO essential. Are Governor's Advisers and broadly representative of Hong Kong opinion.

8.

But

Under no illusion about difficult path ahead. We are

proceeding with talks as quickly as possible and are aware that

confidence in Hong Kong is fragile, in spite of strong economy. important point is to reach right solution in best interests of Hong

Kong.

Chinese propaganda

9.

Recently toned down as result of NCNA directive. Now concentrating less on attacking British 'rigidity' and 'colonialism' and more on reassuring Hong Kong people of benefits PRC will grant

Hong Kong 'when' it becomes SAR of China. More subtle but no less insidious approach than hitherto. Favoured in particular by Ji Peng

Fei in course of recent discussions with wide range of Hong Kong representatives. Hong Kong people still sceptical. Indications that some Chinese Communist cadres in Hong Kong have doubts too.

But doubtful if Chinese leadership hear, or are receptive to,

reports to this effect.

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