I
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4. I am also not sure that we need to seek authority from
No 10 to brief the Japanese a little more fully. I do not
recommend that we should go anywhere near the same lengths as
we do with the Americans and the Old Commonwealth.
5.
However, there is a particular problem that will arise
when Hu Yaobang goes to Japan on 23 November. Hu is quite likely to speak to the Japanese in the same way that Deng Xiaoping spoke to M. Gaston Thorn. There is some advantage in getting in with a message to the Japanese before Hu's visit. Mr Giffard and I are dining at the Japanese Embassy tonight in the context of the Anglo-Japanese planning talks. It should be possible to have a word with the Ambassador about Hu Yaobang's forthcoming visit
to Japan. We could ask him to forewarn his Government about the likely line that the Chinese will take. We should seek to get the message across that the Japanese should not take all the Chinese say as gospel but that we would be interested in any feed- back from the Japanese after the visit.
6. We would then be in a position to report the conversation with the Ambassador to our Embassy in Tokyo asking them to reinforce the points with the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
7
I hope tw. Luce would agree
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