PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
After much initial resistance, the Chinese finally agreed
and a high-powered team had gone, who had suggested to China
the possible outcome of different legal strategies. The symbolic importance of this again was that it enabled the Chinese to say that the US were bending over backwards to try
to resolve the problem. But had also enabled the US to get some
useful information across. The Chinese were on one level very proud and sophisticated, but on another remarkably ignorant. It might help to break down their misconceptions of how we ran Hong Kong if we were to contrive a similar exchange, outside
the arena of the talks, which could both improve understanding
in Peking and also be of value as a confidence building and face
saving measure.
US/CHINA RELATIONS
10.
Mr Wolfowitz said that the Chinese awareness of their own
weakness vis a vis the Soviet Union gave the Americans some leverage upon the Chinese. Privately they were very worried
about the fifty Soviet divisions and the build-up of SS20s,
though they confessed this more readily to the Japanese than to the Americans. This was leverage which the United States possessed so long as they did not proclaim that they had it.
Mr Wolfowitz did not expect the Sino-Soviet talks to go very
far, though the Soviet Union still had a strong interest in pursuing them, and there was evidence of a continuing Soviet diplomatic effort.
11. Mr Wolfowitz commented that the atmosphere of Weinberger's
visit to China had been much better than during Shultz's visit
in February. The US effort on technology transfer had been appreciated and its symbolism, in marking China as a friend in
the United States, had been important. Mr Wu had been relatively
restrained when saying his piece on Taiwan to President Reagan
last week, and the President's response had also been in a low
key. China had been encouraged by generally improving relations
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
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