TNAG-1252-FCO40-1585-Third-countries-and-the-future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 138

GRS 560

SECRET

TELELETTER

никочо 15

9 MAR 1983

FROM:- RN PEIRCEN. PEKING

FILE REF: NIL DATED 8 MARCH 1983

FOLLOWING FOR:-

COPIED TO:-

FUTURE OF HONG KONG:

?

? related to the

Cabinet Münter

Astér

th. cuft

I on minting trefing that if heirse

the Australian

spoke will. I should achantedge in che

W MORRIS ESQ, HKGD FCO

RP MARGOLIS ESQ, DPA, HONG KONG

Hong

couse.

use

سلام الله

72

chap: for I have cared to FED

chép,

AUSTRALIA INTEREST.

1. I HAD LUNCH ON 7 MARCH WITH MY AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUE.

UREN DID NOT REVEAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE JIC PAPER, BUT

NEVERTHELESS HAD A GOOD IDEA OF WHERE WE WERE

See(74

IN THE TALKS. INDEED ANY INTELLIGENT OBSERVER FOLLOWING THE REPORTS CLOSELY, AS UREN DOES, COULD BUILD UP A FAIR PICTURE. HE HAD NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE GOVERNOR HAD NOT YET BEEN UP TO PEKING AND HAD THEREFORE DEDUCED THAT THE TALKS WERE STILL IN A PRELIMINARY STAGE. I DID NOT ATTEMPT TO DENY THIS BUT SAID THAT WE HAD NEVER EXPECTED RAPID RESULTS AND THAT OUR TALKS PROCEEDED

SLOWLY AS WAS NORMAL IN NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS COUNTRY. I DID DENY REPORTS OF A DEADLOCK IN THE TALKS, SAYING THAT NEITHER SIDE HAD PUT ITSELF IN A POSITION FROM WHICH NO MOVEMENT WAS POSSIBLE.

2. UREN SAID HE SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF CHINA MOVING AWAY FROM INSISTENCE ON SOVEREIGNTY. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS UNREALISTIC. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER MRS THATCHER COULD GIVE THEM SOVEREIGNTY.

I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE POWER OF A PRIME MINISTER TO DO SO, BUT POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD AGREED TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE CHINESE DESPITE THEIR STATED POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT THEY KNEW OUR POSITION. TALKS SHOULD COVER THESE QUESTIONS BUT THE AIM WAS TO AGREE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD ALLOW HONG KONG

TO CONTINUE TO PROSPER. SUBJECT TO THAT OBJECTIVE AND

WITHIN THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REALITIES WE COULD BE FLEXIBLE. WE HOPED THE CHINESE COULD TOO.

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