TNAG-1239-FCO40-1552-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 85

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6.

If however EXCO recommended that an arrangement, which we saw

as reasonable, was unacceptable, or if EXCO were divided in their

own views the Governor considers that they should be confronted with

three choices:

(a) to accept what we believed was the best deal to which

China would agree;

(b) to continue to seek improved terms;

(c) to adjourn the negotiations.

EXCO would need to be left in no doubt that we were pessimistic

about (b) and that (c) would probably lead to a stand off and a major slide in confidence in Hong Kong. Given the terms of the 1898 Convention we could not in any case hold on to the New Territories

and the practical consequence would be a Chinese take over. If EXCO

chose that route we should have to consider it. The important point

would be that we should not conclude an agreement with China which

EXCO would not endorse, but that EXCO would accept the consequences

that might follow from this.

7.

Beyond this is the problem that we cannot be sure that the

views of EXCO are totally representative of the people of Hong Kong. The Governor believes in the light of his meetings with the

Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council, who are briefed

regularly in general terms, and of the assessments of public opinion

made by the Hong Kong Government, that they are broadly representative. He recognises however that this will not

necessarily remain so.

8.

There are ways of broadening consultation but there are major

difficulties. At the back of the problem is the declared view of

the Chinese Government that the talks are bilateral ones with HMG

and that, while they are prepared to take the views of the people of Hong Kong into account, those do not carry significant weight

against the wishes of the one billion Chinese. This means that an official referendum in Hong Kong would probably lead to repudiation of any agreement. The point is not simply that the Chinese would fear that the electorate would vote against particular arrangements

but that their own nationalist principles cannot allow that a minority group of Chinese "compatriots" should have a veto on how

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