TNAG-1239-FCO40-1552-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 6

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

HKK040 ||

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY

1 AUG 1983

449

40

Mr Elliott FED

CHINA

1.

DESK OFFICER

REGISTRY

INDEX

PK

Action Taken

Crisstr

Thank you for sending me a copy of Sir P Cradock's despatch of 11 July on the Sixth National People's Congress (NPC), and of your comments on it (your minute to Mr Donald of 19 July).

2.

As regards China's I very much agree with your comments. foreign policy (your para 3c), I would merely add the observation that at a time of strain in their relations with the USA as well as the USSR the Chinese may have adopted the more favourable attitude towards Western Europe partly for tactical reasons; they thereby demonstrate their continued commitment to good relations with the West and hope that this will encourage the United States to pursue a more helpful attitude towards China.

3. On internal affairs, the ascendancy of Deng and his followers was reflected in the ministerial appointments at the NPC. But three elements in the leadership emerging from the Congress seem to me to confirm that Deng and his group have still. not achieved complete dominance.

4.

First of these is the appointment of Li Xiannian as President. As a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Li is probably

As you said, he would not still influential despite ill-health.

be Deng's choice for the Presidency.

5.

Mr. Hoare

Further signs of difficulties encountered by Deng are:

(a) the obviously unsatisfactory arrangement whereby the newly created State Military Commission has turned out to be no more than the Party Military Commission under another name; and

(b) Deng's own continuation as principal leader responsible for the armed forces, now as Chairman of both Military Commissions. There is no satisfactory explanation for the decision to create a State Military Commission except as stratagem by Deng's group to undermine the power of the veteran military leaders entrenched in the Party Commission. But the military leaders have clearly thwarted this plan. Moreover, Deng's continuation as Chairman of the Party Military Commission suggests that there was no younger leader for this key post who was both trusted by Deng and acceptable to the military hierarchy.

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