TNAG-1235-FCO40-1548-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 50

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K. B. Bucknall 125

haps getting the carlier ceded-in-perpetuity arcas also put under the Icase. Under this solution, China would be seen to be negotiating with foreign colonialists and extending their term of existence, which would be both politically and ideologically awkward and additionally Britain would have to give up a territory which it sees as legally belonging to it. Both sides clearly have to make con- 1

cessions.

A third possible solution might be for the Hong Kong authorities to give up some sovereignty, whether with a new lease or the status quo continuing in an undefined way, for example with a phrase such as "until the time is ripe for China to assume authority over the whole area." This might take the form of the Hong Kong authorities not making new laws or amending old ones without the stated approval of the Chinese government, either national or of Guangdong. This would have the merit of China visibly gaining power and being the real master of Hong Kong without perhaps resulting in much economic damage. Whether the British govern- ment and Hong Kong authority would accept this is not clear, but with some safeguards it should not be out of the question.

A less extreme version might be for the New Territories to be run for China by the Hong Kong authorities, but the remainder of Hong Kong to maintain the status quo. This might involve the payment of a regular fee to China, rather along the lines of the ancient tributary state system. The difference between this and the preceding version is merely how much power China gains, which would be a matter for negotiation.

A somewhat more restrictive solution for the Hong Kong au- thority could be for a joint government perhaps, possibly presented by China as a form of united front tactic or an international state version of the domestic joint state-private enterprise in China. A less restrictive solution might be for the Hong Kong authorities to continue to run the area but for China rather than for Britain, which would have the merit of an efficiently managed Hong Kong owned clearly and legally by China possibly with an annual pay- ment by Hong Kong.

It might be possible to adopt a transition stage with China as- suming power over foreign affairs with the Hong Kong authority running the rest. The main merit here would seem to be a clear division of responsibility, but it would involve a mixed government which might not be acceptable to either side.

A solution that would reduce the area of Hong Kong substantial-

HMG,

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