TNAG-1235-FCO40-1548-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 32

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K. B. Bucknall 107

Despite ethnic similarity, there is an observable social difference between those born and educated in Hong Kong and immigrants of recent years—newcomers from China tend to be less well edu- cated, less dynamic as individuals and not prepared to work so hard, yet many wish for instant wealth. It is partly for this reason and partly because every addition to population in over-crowded Hong Kong adds to the existing problems in sectors such as housing and transport that many Hong Kong residents are firmly against letting in more Chinese and they support the government's policy of repatriating illegal immigrants.

Politically, until 1978, the relationship between China and Hong Kong was cautious to the point of immiscibility; for the most part cach officially ignored the other. Practically, the Hong Kong gov- crnment watched carefully and was most careful not to offend China by an action that could be taken amiss; China seemingly ignored Hong Kong unless its attention was attracted by events such as the riots of 1967. Unofficial communication occurred as necessary. In the past China would not address itself to the "gov- ernment" or the "governor" of Hong Kong but preferred to use the "authorities" in order to avoid symbolic recognition of an alien government or the existence of a colony on its land. Since the then governor of Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, was invited to celebrate national day in Beijing on October 1, 1978 and then visited China officially in March 1979, China has demonstrated that it recognizes the colony and desires a closer relationship. Dur- ing the visit, Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission Deng Xiaoping reassured Hong Kong and present or potential investors there that it had a future, using the oft-quoted words "tell in- vestors to put their hearts at ease." The status quo appears for the moment to be quite satisfactory to Beijing.

Strategically there is currently little of interest between China and Hong Kong: Hong Kong is not a threat to China, while the latter could probably take the former by force in a matter of a few hours but has shown no signs of wishing to do so. There would be a small strategic gain from a take-over, inasmuch as Taiwanese, Soviet or Vietnamese spies or saboteurs could be prevented from using Hong Kong as a base, but also a small loss in that in the event of war, with a neighboring state, a neutral Hong Kong might provide logistical support by being a channel for goods into China. Hong Kong would provide a good harbor for China, as it is the deepest, largest, best equipped and most efficient port on the China.