Mh. Donald
Mr Clift, HKD
SECRET
mreler, HKD / This could be an effective argument, OcMr Cox, FED 2 Another weful hour for Mr Healt to
Mr Howe HKD
emphasise might be the need for a MrsPrier!
settlement to command the confidence of the Hong Kong hestle, not merely their
Інко
Mr Wye, RD
MR HEATH'S VISIT TO CHINA: FUTURE OF HONG KONG
1.
acceptance, if it is to work well.
felker
10.8.
I have been trying (perhaps naively) to think whether there is one single telling point we could urge Mr Heath to make to Deng Xiaoping if, as is likely, they meet in Peking. The meeting, incidentally, will give us a clear indication of whether the Chinese side is likely to be more flexible when talks re-open in late September.
2. I wonder whether Mr Heath could effectively sow the thought that Deng's plan for Hong Kong could well go the way of Mao's Great Leap Forward (which Deng originally supported). He could say he has reflected on Deng's remarks in April 1982. At first sight these seemed to offer a good solution to Hong Kong's 1997 problem. But, on further pragmatic consideration of the facts, they seem premature, under-estimating the complexity of Hong Kong's economy and the fragility of confidence. Fifteen years is too short a time. It would be tragic to repeat the terrible waste of the Great Leap and for Deng's name to go down in history linked to such a mistake. And the crunch would come not in 1997 but in 1984/85 when the Chinese plan is announced or if there is deadlock in the UK/China talks. Moreover Hong Kong's ''Great Leap Forward'' would be irreversible.
3. I think Mr Heath could find a way to make points of this kind in a non-confrontational way. It is just possible, though very unlikely, that from such a source they might give Deng pause for thought. In any case I think it would be worth having them in the record of the meeting. They might remind Chinese readers of the passage on page 305 of Deng's Selected Works (roughly translated):
''[Chairman Mao's] mistakes began in the late 1950's.
For example the Great Leap Forward was wrong. This responsibility was not just Chairman Mao's; the minds of all us people were in a fever. We completely turned our backs on objective [economic] laws and tried to raise the economy at a stroke. When subjective aspirations violate objective laws, losses are bound to be suffered. But the main responsibility for the Great Leap Forward itself was Chairman Mao's
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Deng's colleagues know that his greatest fault is impulsiveness.
Norox
CODE IN
10 August 1983
Copied to:
Mr Walker, Research D
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Mr Hoare HKD
Mrs Priest HKD
יה
SECRET
N J Cox
FED
W 82 233 5539
See minute :
altached
Astreld 1978
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