TNAG-1229-FCO40-1542-Possible-visit-by-the-Secretary-of-State-for-Foreign-and-Com-1983 — Page 42

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

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Sir Antony Acland KCMG KVCO

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Dear Antony"

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ANTONY ACLAND

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Mr. Hear this p Mr. Morris

Dmr je

BRITISH EMBASSY,

23 May 1983

PEKING

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1. In his letter of 5 May to you about a possible visit by the Secretary of State to Hong Kong in the autumn, Teddy Youde invited my views on whether Mr Pym should visit Peking as part of the same tour.

2. As Teddy notes, this will depend on the state of the Hong Kong talks. A visit to Peking by the Secretary of State, or for that matter by another FCO minister, would be bound to raise expectations that some new development in the talks was about to be made public. If, however, no real progress could be reported during such a visit, the damage to confidence could be considerable. Moreover, there would be a high risk that, with the glare of publicity on the matter, the Chinese might make public statements about the talks which would be unhelpful both to confidence in Hong Kong and to the atmosphere of the negotiations.

3. My view, therefore, is that the Secretary of State should not visit Peking this year, except perhaps if we are in one of two extreme positions over the talks, either (a) so close to agreement that Mr Pym could come to put his personal imprimatur on it, or (b) deadlocked and in danger of breakdown, in which case a high-level visit might be used in an attempt to get things moving again. Scenario (a) is most unlikely, but scenario (b) is, I fear, possible.

4. On the more likely assumption that we are in neither of these situations, it would be better if he did not come here. If, however, he visited Hong Kong without coming to Peking, it would be better from the Peking angle if his visit could be seen to be part of a wider tour with a definable different objective. This would help to prevent the Chinese, who see a sinister motive in everything, from concluding that the visit was an attempt to gain support in Hong Kong for the British position, and perhaps initiating some counter-propaganda of their own.

HKK027/18

RECEIVED WI REGSTRY NO. 51

1 JUN 1983

DESK OFFICU INDEX

BAGISTRY

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Yours weer Лиси

Часо

PERCY CRADOCK

ADOCK

cc Sir Edward Youde GCMG

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL