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4.
The reference to 'anti-Soviet implications' in the middle paragraph on the fifth page of
summary is puzzling, as is the suggestion that these may have led to the dismissal of the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris who had negotiated the communique. The communique as published did not contain any anti-Soviet implications. However, HM Embassy in Lisbon reported that it had been generally believed there that earlier reluctance on the part of the Chinese to agree on diplomatic relations reflected their concern over Soviet influence in Portugal (Lisbon telno 73, 20 February 1979).
5. The most relevant point to current concerns seems to me to be the assertion on the sixth page of
summary about points agreed between China and Portugal: ie that there would never be any unilateral initiative to change the status quo of Macao; that there would be no changes without negotiations; that changes could only take place
when the time was right for both parties'; that Portugal's declaration of 6 January 1975 would 'serve to maintain the status quo'; and that China accepted Portugal's point on historical legacy. goes much further than any previous reports that I can recall of points secretly agreed between the two governments.
This
CC:
KC Walker
Far Eastern Section Research Department
RD GLift, HKD
M Elliott, FED
Dr H Boreland, Western and Southern European Section, RD
RN Pierce, Peking
Chancery, Lisbon
R Codrington, SED
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN CLOSED FOR
...40..YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION No. 40 (2), 38, LI
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