TNAG-1220-FCO40-1530-Democratic-representation-and-reform-in-Hong-Kong-1983 — Page 62

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TO PRIORITY F C O

FM HONG KONG 130545Z DEC 83

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1925 OF 13 DECEMSER

INFO PRIORITY PEKING

MY TELNO 1714:

یح

FUTURE OF HONG KONG : CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

1. THIS TELEGRAM MAKES PROPOSALS ON HOW THE FUTURE GOVERNOR/CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OF AN AUTONOMOUS HONG KONG MIGHT BE SELECTED AND APPOINTED

TO COMPLETE THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE SET OUT IN MY TELNO 1714.

THE NEED TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS NOW

2. WE NEED TO CONSIDER THE VARIOUS ISSUES RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE NOW BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT THE CHINESE ARE WORKING ON A MINI-CONSTITUTION AND THEY ARE TALKING IN TERMS OF CONSULTATION WITH THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG ON IT (PEKING TELNOS 1314 AND 1315). WE SHOULD NOT LET THEM BECOME COMMITTED TO PROPOSALS

WHICH WILL THEN BE SET IN CONCRETE OR SHOW THEME SELVES MORE INTERESTED IN THE VIEWS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG THAN WE ARE.

MOREOVER, IF WE ARE TO DISCUSS WITH THEM (AS WE SHALL NEED TO EARLY NEXT YEAR) WHAT IS TO HAPPEN AFTER 1997 WE MUST HAVE SOME

IDEA OF WHAT INSTITUTIONS WE WOULD EXPECT TO HAVE IN PLACE BEFORE

1997. IF THEY ARE IN PLACE AND HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED LOCALLY AS A

RESPONSE TO THE DEMAND FOR 'DEMOCRATISATION, THE CHINESE MIGHT

BECOME MORE SENSITIVE TO THE RISKS INVOLVED IN INTERFERING WITH

THEM.

THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

3. IN PUTTING PROPOSALS FORWARD I HAVE KEPT IN MIND THE REQUIREMENTS

WHICH UNDERLAY THE PROPOSALS IN MY TUR. IN PARTICULAR ANY NEW ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD

(1) RESPOND TO THE DEMAND FOR

DEMOCRATISATION''.

THERE IS A GROWING DEMAND FOR THIS NOT JUST FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT BECAUSE IT IS PERCEIVED AS A POSSIBLE BARRIER TO CHINESE INTERFERENCE AFTER 1997. THUS THESE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD

(11) GIVE THE ADMINISTRATION AS GREAT A DEGREE AS POSSIBLE OF

AUTHORITY DRAWN FROM POPULAR SUPPORT IN HONG KONG

(111) BUILD AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ON EXISTING INSTITUTIONS: AND

(IV) TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SENSITIVITIES OF PEKING IN ORDER TO

MINIMISE THE INCENTIVE FOR THEM TO INTERFERE.

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