joint enterprise, and also that the learned judge failed to direct the jury adequately as to the basis on which the jury should consider whether the 3rd defendant was part of the joint enterprise involving the 1st and 2nd appellants."
(3).
(4)
"And then later he dealt with this
matter again when he was dealing with the 3rd appellant's statement 'Of course, that last few pages of the 3rd accused's statement, if true, are totally damning
he said this:-
'You have got to make your minds
up about these very serious allegations that are being made. The Crown says that this 3rd accused knew perfectly well that highly dangerous weapons were going to be taken on a robbery, and might be used if necessary to effect the robbery or to effect an escape, and that that might involve doing very serious bodily harm, if not worse.'
Pausing there, although the learned trial judge does not say so explicitly, it was of course the Crown case that the 3rd accused was guilty of murder and it was perfectly clear and must have been perfectly clear to the jury that the learned judge was referring in that passage to murder."
"And he goes on:-
'If you thought that the 3rd accused knew that these weapons were being taken on a robbery, but that they would not be used to do serious harm, but only to do rather minor bodily harm, something less than serious bodily harm, you could convict him of manslaughter'
... in our judgment and bearing in mind the previous direction ... with regard to the necessity for knowledge and agreement in the mind of the 3rd appellant before he can be found guilty of murder, taking it as a whole that direction is not objectionable and was not in any way confusing to the jury nor were they confused because in fact they did find
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