A
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British Nationality
[13 OCTOBER 1981]
thiruntries may need the information to determine thesition under visa abolition agreements. For these purposes the short answer British is not suf- ficient. At present if a person entering the United Kingdom completes the landing card saying "British" and he is not a patrial, the immigration officer will need to add to or alter the entry on the landing card accordingly.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, in his interesting speech referred to the fact that the words British national" do appear, I think in Schedule 7 of the Bill. But, of course, used in this way the term "national" is primarily a drafting device. simply to describe the various categories to whom that particular legislation applies. It does not imply that this collective description is necessarily applicable in other circumstances. As the noble Lord recognised, the term is used frequently in international treaties in the same sense, with the scope of the term varying from treaty to treaty or from Act to Act according to the circumstances.
Indeed, the noble and learned Lord may be interested to know the position under the European Convention of Human Rights in this matter. The fourth protocol to that convention provides that no one shall be de- prived of the right to enter the territory of the state of which he is a national. I agree that the United Kingdom has not yet ratified this Convention, but the provision in it illustrates yet again, I suggest, the dif- ferent interpretations that can be placed by different states on the relationship between the state and its nationals.
In the absence of a recognised definition, at least in our domestic law, some may turn to a dictionary. They will find the word national "defined as--and I am quoting from the Concise Oxford Dictonary——
A citizen of a specified country". In other words, under this amendment citizens of the British dependent territories, and indeed British overseas citizens, might think that they were also British citizens, which of course they will not be. It is this sort of understandable but undesirable confusion that the Bill seeks to elimi- nate but which this amendment will in fact perpetuate. It is, after all, one of our major objectives to provide a new scheme of citizenship which makes clear whether a person belongs to the United Kingdom itself or to its existing dependencies or its former dependencies. Having gone to the length of creating separate citizen- ships we would not favour a measure which suggested that the holder stood in the same relationship in citizenship terms to the United Kingdom. He does. not, and it is important that we do not suggest this. As I have said, I am afraid we see real difficulties in this amendment which would run counter to our basic aim of three distinctive citizenships. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend will not press his amendment, but if he does I hope that your Lordships will not support him in the Lobby.
Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, whether this amendment is or is not carried, the situation undoubtedly will remain that all passports issued in respect of the persons dealt with under Part I, Part II and Part III of this Bill will be British passports. They will carry the imprint of the Royal Arms; they will be issued in the name of the Foreign Secretary, who will enjoin
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all persons dealing with the citizens that they cover to allow them to enter and pass through territories without let or hindrance. They will be persons travelling under British passports. Of that there can be no doubt whatsoever.
The amendment is concerned to a large extent with the very special, if not indeed unique, position of the people of Hong Kong, but, of course, it has a very much wider effect than that. There are many, many people in many, many territories the world over who will feel doubt and uncertainty coming in the train of this legislation, and who would be comforted and made to feel more secure if this amendment were to be carried. As the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, has already made very clear, there is not the slightest danger or possibility that the 5 million people of Hong Kong, or indeed any percentage of them, will say that they wish to avail themselves of any gap that had been made in the wall of the Government's certainty to combat a flow of people into the United Kingdom. And indeed there is no suggestion that there should be any change whatsoever from the attitudes currently existing. Of the 5 million people in Hong Kong some 2.6 million are at this present moment citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. Hong Kong, like so many other territories, is subject to a strict voucher quota in so far as immigration into the United Kingdom is concerned. The quota at the moment---I am sure I shall be corrected by the noble Lord the Minister if I am wrong--is 150 per annum. Last year 100 persons availed themselves of that privilege. That is the scale that we are talking about in immigration
terms.
But, of course, this is not a question of figures; this is not a question of legal semantics. It is a question of the people of Hong Kong fearing that something might be done in this Bill that will have evil and disastrous consequences in so far as they are concerned. I am sure that there is no one in this House who would wish to see the position of Hong Kong vis-à-vis any other power or any other part of the world weakened in the slightest degree. That is the purpose of the amendment.
The Minister makes the point that there is no univer- sal definition of nationality. For my own part I could not see how that in itself advanced his argument. The rules of international law in this matter-and I certainly do not seek to pose as any expert at all in that wide and distinguished field--as I understand them are these: first, that it is entirely a matter for each state to define nationality as far as its own citizens are concerned. It is for that state to say who shall enjoy its services, who shall have a right of abode, who shall have the privilege of being protected by its passports. The second rule is that when that state expects other countries, other states, to consider the rules of nationality that it has drawn up, if those rules of nationality are to command any universal acceptance they must conform with general universal principles; in other words, they must define nationality in such a way as to adhere to the principle of a close and intimate connection between the subject and the sovereign state that gives him nationality. That, as I understand it, is the effect of the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case of 1955.
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