TNAG-1191-FCO40-1493-Implications-for-Hong-Kong-of-changes-in-the-British-nationa-1982 — Page 107

and the current state of customary international

law on the matter appears to us to ba uncertain.

Moreover, when one seeks to analyse the suggested

obligation in order to see to what extent its form and boundaries can be determined, this process is found to be by no means simple. What is the obligation? Is it to allow return or to allow entry? To whom is

the obligation owed? To an expelling State or to all

States? If the former, does that mean that until a State expels a national (or resident or belonger) of

.........

another State no obligation arises? If so, it would

appear to follow that each State could expel its own nationals (or residents or belongers) without breach of international law, and that its obligation would arise only when some other State had accepted and then expelled such persons from its territory?

What are the limits of the suggested obligation?

A suggested limit is that it is owed in respect of someone who has nowhere else to go. But why should it matter to

an expelling State whether the expellee has somewhere else to go?

The expelling State's interest in the expellee (assuming that the expelling State has no obligations in respect of him) is in getting him off its territory.

To the expelling State it then ceases to matter whether some other (or which) State is under obligation to receive him. This question is relevant to the principle which is said to be the foundation of the obligation, that of reciprocity; for the principle of reciprocity has meaning only if it matters to the expelling State whether some other