TNAG-1181-FCO40-1483-Resettlement-of-Vietnamese-refugees-from-Hong-Kong-into-the--1982 — Page 82

1. 2.

CONFIDENTIAL WE

.

6.

Option (a) would have the strongest deterrent

effect. However, it would be impractical to implement.

It would attract strong objections from the UNHCR and

probably some criticism from both overseas and local

voluntary agencies. But more importantly it would pose

serious practical problems. Staff would have to be

assembled; physical security would have to be greatly

increased and finally there would be great problems to

be overcome in incarcerating refugees, accustomed to

the freedom of open camps, in closed camps.

7.

Option (b) is a possibility. Processing takes

about 6 weeks and so at any time there are about 1,200

refugees here who could be put in closed camps if the

closed camp policy goes ahead. To adopt this course would

be a clear indication of how seriously the Government

́ views the situation. Against this it would use up

rather scarce closed camp facilities and might also

prove rather difficult to implement if refugees who re

here prove unco-operative in accepting removal to a

closed camp.

8.

Option (c) would deter possible newcomers and

provide a sanction on likely trouble-makers in open.

camps. The latter would, however, require the provision

of the necessary legal powers to remove refugees from

one type of camp to another, after the case had been the

/sublect