TNAG-1176-FCO40-1478-Air-services-between-the-UK--China-and-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 145

SECRET

B

ARGUMENT

7.

The air services arguments for the proposed action are clear. DOT Ministers have accepted them, subject to the

concurrence of the Hong Kong authorities.

8.

Anglo/Chinese relations need not be seriously affected

by the action proposed or by an eventual suspension of services.

The Embassy in Peking would speak to the MFA to explain the

background, pointing out the need for a careful review in the

light of the many changes since 1979 and our desire to achieve a more balanced agreement. If CAAC obstinancy and brinkmanship look likely to lead to a suspension of services, the Embassy could again approach the MFA and perhaps also China Travel

Services to explain again that the fault is not on the British

side.

In September the notice period will still have eight months to run so there is no danger of clouding the Prime

Minister's visit.

He therefore seeks (a) an

assurance

9. As for the Hong Kong implications of the action proposed, the Governor has pointed out that the crunch might come when we

are in negotiation with the Chinese about the future. He

suggests that it would be risky to commit ourselves to a

simultaneous show-down with CAAC on an issue which the MFA may

view as one of sovereignty.

that we consider the balance of advantage to lie in giving notice (if so he would inform Executive Council); (b) confirmation

that Hong Kong-Canton services would not be excluded from any suspension of regional services; and (c) consideration of

the effect of an impending row with CAAC on construction of a second airport in Hong Kong. On (b) we are all agreed with the

Governor that Canton could not sensibly be excluded. On the replacement

there is a risk that failure to reach an seoond airport in Hong Kong, the timetable is so long that wo with CAAC on certain technical matters could delay the project. But CAAC are already showning no

do not think a row with CAAG in 1083/3 is likely to delay wish to co-operate and have failed to respond to requests for talks. It may be that

eonstruction. In many ways the atmosphere for cooperation is

understanding

more likely to be affected by the continuing trench warfare which

we will face unless we can reach a more satisfactory agreement. We think the risk is acceptable.

SECRET

/10.