TNAG-1175-FCO40-1477-Proposed-replacement-airport-for-Hong-Kong-at-Deep-Bay-or-Ch-1982 — Page 2

(b)

(c):

(d)

(e)

to define the effects on development of the NWNT and the implications in terms of transport infrastructure;

in so doing, to avoid overflight of:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

the Chinese mainland on the airport's approach and departure tracks;

the waters of Deep Bay to the north and west of the Deep Bay mid-line;

other Chinese waters and islands to a greater degree than at present occurs with Kai Tak;

to ensure that the reclamation for the airport itself did not extend beyond the Deep Bay mid-line;

and

to quantify the extent to which deviations from the most desirable operating require- ments, including curved approaches and departures, would lessen the effectiveness of an airport at Deep Bay.

Arguments for and against a

full consultancy on Deep Bay

5

In the light of the consultants' findings, the arguments for and against a full consultancy on the possibility of an airport at Deep Bay have been carefully considered and the purpose of this memorandum is to explain why a full consultancy on Deep Bay is ruled out.

6

In broad terms the principal arguments in favour

of a full-scale consultancy on Deep Bay are that:

(a)

the development of a replacement inter- national airport should be viewed as part of an overall strategy of development, a principal object of which should be to achieve the most cost-effective use of resources. Thus a decision on the siting of a replacement airport should be made in the context of an appropriate evaluation of all reasonable total development options, and in particular of investment commitments to major items. Capital expenditure over the next five years on public housing and new towns, railways and highways and other public works could average $13.5 billion per annum compared with $7.7 billion in 1981.

SECRET