TNAG-1173-FCO40-1465-Future-of-Hong-Kong-special-study-by-FCO-for-the-Prime-Minis-1982 — Page 285

Mr Clift, HKGD

SECRET

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VED IN REGGE€14, 2 4 AUG 1982

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TO

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

1.

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ZA

Mr Morris yesterday gave me a copy of FCO telno 631 to Hong Kong of 18 August, ie the main paper on the Future of Hong Kong. FED have not been involved in most of the meetings which have led to this draft. It is therefore difficult for us to comment as we do not know the argument which has led you to some of the conclusions. But I should nonetheless like to make one or two observations.

2.

First I am doubtful that we should imply (see para 7) that we can reach an''interim understanding with the PRC to solve the problem of local leases of Crown land in the New Territories'' without ''lengthy and tough negotiation'' of the kind needed for a substantive agreement. I do not know what kind of Chinese ''statement'' you envisage the Prime Minister seeking (para 38), but at first sight such an approach would seem to put at risk our entire strategy. We are all well aware of the suspicion with which the Chinese view our interest in the Hong Kong question; they would probably suspect a trap and could certainly be reluctant to throw away one of their best negotiating cards. They would naturally wonder what incentive would then remain for us to close quickly with their terms for British disengagement. Any such Chinese statement would have to be agreed at the highest political level and, even after the further strengthening of Deng's position we expect to result from the 12th Party Congress, I cannot see how people like Hu Qiaomu, let alone the PLA leaders, could accept what would seem to them a unilateral Chinese concession to colonialism.

་

3.

Otherwise I do not substantially dissent from the line you propose the Prime Minister might take (your paragraphs 35 to 37), but:

(a) It might be better for the Prime Minister to take the

initiative rather than respond to a Chinese line. The Chinese have often asked for our ideas on the Future.

(b) The Prime Minister would need to show understanding of

the strong national feelings of all Chinese people about Chinese territorial integrity, and about the humiliating events of the 19th century.

(c) We must be careful how, in negotiations, we play on our

fundamental common interest with the PRC in maintaining Hong Kong's welfare and prosperity. The Chinese well know that they have an interest in this, but will not thank us for labouring the point tête à tête. From their point of view the nature of our interest is quite different ours is the interest of an exploiting,

SECRET

/colonial

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