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RECENTLY BEEN IN PEKING. LIAO HAS BEEN PRESENT AT A LARGE NUMBER OF THE MEETINGS WHICH HONG KONG CHINESE HAVE HAD WITH TENG AND ZHAO. (I PROPOSE TO REPLY THROUGH THE SAME CHANNELS THAT LIAO'S MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD). AFTER ALL THAT WE HAVE SAID ABOUT THE NEED TO GIVE EARLY ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM, I THINK THE CHINESE WILL BE PUZZLED IF WE NOW SHOW RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN ANY INFORMAL PREPARATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, 3. IF THEY ARE TO BE USEFUL, PREPARATORY TALKS WILL HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED AT A HIGH LEVEL AND TO BE INITIATED SUFFICIENTLY FAR IN ADVANCE OF THE VISIT TO ALLOW THE CHINESE TO DIGEST WHAT WE HAVE TO SAY. THIS SUGGESTS THAT WE SHOULD APPROACH THEM IN EARLY
AUGUST.
4. I ACCEPT THAT WE MUST USE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS ONE CHANNEL.
ZHANG WENJIN IS AS GOOD AN INTERLOCUTOR AS WE ARE LIKELY TO GET
AND THE AMBASSADOR CAN SEE HIM WHENEVER NECESSARY WITHOUT
ATTRACTING PUBLICITY. BUT THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE STRONGLY
SUGGESTS THAT THE MFA HAVE A LIMITED ROLE IN POLICY MAKING IN THIS
AREA, AND IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO RELY EXCLUSIVELY ON THEM. WE NEED A LINE TO THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AS WELL. ONE WAY OF ESTABLISHING THIS
WOULD BE FOR ME TO VISIT CANTON, WHICH I COULD EASILY DO, AND ENGINEER A CONFIDENTIAL TALK WITH LIAO CHENGZHI WHILE THERE. AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR ME TO GO TO PEKING: GIVEN A HINT, THE CHINESE WOULD NO DOUBT ISSUE AN INVITATION AND I WOULD PROBABLY BE RECEIVED BY DENG AND LIAO AS WELL AS FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS.
BUT SUCH A VISIT WOULD HAVE A HIGH PROFILE' AND MIGHT NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO INFORMAL DISCUSSION. MY PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO GO TO PEKING AFTER MRS THATCHER, AS A FOLLOW-UP TO HER DISCUSSIONS. I COULD NOT EASILY GO TWICE WITHIN THE SPACE OF A FEW MONTHS. 5. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY TALKS WOULD BE TO EXPLAIN TO THE CHINESE FRANKLY THAT FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST THE PROSPERITY
AND STABILITY OF HONG KONG CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED IF THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ADMINISTERING THE TERRITORY ARE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, AND URGE THEM NOT TO ADOPT ANY FIRM POSITION PENDING TALKS WITH THE PM. BUT IN PRESENTING THE NEED FOR CONTINUING BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, WE MUST BE ABLE TO INDICATE THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS NEGOTIABLE. OTHERWISE WE SHALL RISK THE SAME KIND OF REBUFF WHICH WE SUFFERED IN 1979. WE SHALL ALSO NEED TO SHOW CONCERN FOR CHINESE POLITICAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES BY MAKING CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT ASKING THEM TO PUT ASIDE THE REINTEGRATION OF THE TERRITORY WITH CHINA FOR EVER. OUR LINE WILL HAVE TO BE THAT WE RECOGNISE THE TIME WILL COME WHEN THE CHINESE WILL WANT HONG KONG BACK: BUT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE CHINESE AS WELL AS THAT OF
THE POPULATION OF HONG KONG AND THE UK (IN THAT ORDER) TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO UNTIL REINCORPORATION CAN BE CONTEMPLATED WITHOUT DAMAGE TO HONG KONG'S PROSPERITY. TO THIS END WE MUST SOMEHOW REMOVE
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