TNAG-1172-FCO40-1453-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 12

SECRET

GRS 600

SECRET

FM HONG KONG 280915Z JUNE 82

TO PRIORITY F C O (PERSONAL FOR DONALD)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 684 OF 28 JUNE

INFO PEKING (PERSONAL FOR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES)

FROM GOVERNOR

373

YOUR TELNO 473 AND PEKING TEL NO 353

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

(368)

(381)

TOP Curt

HKK

oyell

14/7

plans ista

1. I HAVE ALL ALONG ASSUMED THAT MINISTERIAL DECISIONS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL BEFORE WE TALK TO THE CHINESE ON ANY BASIS.

2. THERE SEEMS TO BE A GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON THE ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY, THE NEED FOR CONTINUING BRITISH ADMINISTRATION, AND WHAT WE MIGHT AIM FOR DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, AND IT WOULD BE WISE TO CONCENTRATE ON THESE IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH HER.

357

3. THAT LEAVES THE QUESTION OF WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO

THE CHINESE IN ADVANCE AND WHEN, HERE THERE ARE THREE ASPECTS. AS IS EXPLAINED IN MY TELNO 647, THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF CONSULTATION AND COMMENT BY THE CHINESE IN RECENT MONTHS TO WHICH, IN THE ABSENCE OF POLICY DECISIONS WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO RESPOND. SECONDLY, WHETHER OR NOT VISITORS FROM HONG KONG HAVE EDUCATED THE CHINESE IN THE ECONOMIC REALITIES THEY HAVE CERTAINLY NOT FACED UP TO THE KEY POINT - THAT BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IS ESSENTIAL TO CONTINUING CONFIDENCE. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT LEFT TO THEMSELVES THEY SHY AWAY FROM THIS ISSUE. SOME OF THEM MIGHT AGREE TO CARRY A QUOTABLE MESSAGE FROM ME BUT AS THINGS STAND I AM IN NO POSITION TO GO THIS

FAR. THERE IS THEREFORE NOT MUCH MORE TO BE GOT OUT OF VISITS BY BUSINESSMEN. THE THIRD IS YOUR WISH, SHARED BY THE AMBASSADOR TO AVOID PRE-EMPTING THE PM'S DISCUSSIONS.

See 688A

SECRET

14. WE