TNAG-1172-FCO40-1453-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 10

111) MATO

FREITAS DO AMARAL TOOK THE LEAD ON THIS AND ON MILITARY AID. THE PORTUGUESE RECOGNISED THAT SPANISH ACCESSION WAS GOOD FOR SPAIN AND GOOD FOR THE ALLIANCE, BUT IT NEVERTHELESS PRESENTED CERTAIN PROBLEMS FOR PORTUGAL. THE PORTUGUESE COULD NOT ACCEPT A UNITED COMMAND IN THE PENINSULAR, ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD SEPARATE CONTINENTAL PORTUGAL FROM THE AZORES AND MADEIRA (AND THUS RISK ENCOURAGING SEPARATISM) OR HAVING SPANISH GENERALS IN CHARGE OF PORTUGUESE FORCES. THE BEST SOLUTION WAS FOR PORTUGAL TO LOOK TOWARDS THE ATLANTIC (A POINT ECHOED BY FUTSCHER PEREIRA) AND SPAIN TOWARDS THE CONTINENT. IT WAS IPORTANT TO AVOID IN THE PORTUGUESE / SPANISH CONTEXT

THE SORT OF DIFFICULTIES OVER NATO MATTERS WHICH HAD ARISEN BETWEEN

GREECE AND TURKEY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL BUT COMMENTED THAT THE IDEA OF AN ATLANTIC ROLE FOR PORTUGAL SEEMED TO HIM TO MAKE SENSE.

IV) MILITARY AID

FREITAS DO AMARAL WAS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF THE US CONTRIBUTION WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN REDUCED FOR 30 TO 10 MILLIAN DOLLARS, WHILE MILITARY AID TO MOROCCO, TUNISIA, GREECE AND TURKEY HAD INCREASED AND WHILE THE AMERICANS WERE SEEKING EXTENDED FACILITIES IN THE AZORES FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE. PORTUGAL WAS GETTING LESS HELP FROM THE AMERICANS AS A DEMOCRACY THAN IT HAD AS A DICTATORSHIP. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD BEEN KEPT AT PRETTY FULLY STRETCH IN MAINTAINING OUT COMMITMENT TO THE THREE PER CENT INCREASE AND NOW HAD THE ADDITIONAL BURDED OF THE FALKLANDS (AND OPERATION WHICH HAD BROUGHT TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO THE FREE WORLD IN GENERAL BUT FOR WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY THE BILL). FREITAS DO AMARAL TOOK THE POINT, BUT HOPED THAT WE WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROGRAMME OF AID TO PORTUGAL ON WHICH DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. HE DID NOT REFER SPECIFICALLY TO HELICOPTERS, ALTHOUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD DONE SO EARLIER.

V) SOUTHERN AFRICA

BALSEMAO, WHO WAS SETTING OFF FOR A VISIT TO MOZAMBIQUE, EXPRESSEND CONCERN ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN ATTEMPTS TO DESTARLISE THE

GOVERNMENT. THE RIGHT WAY TO COMPAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, NOT TO BRING THEM TO THEIR KNEES. PORTUGAL WAS PREPARED TO INCREASE ITS PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE, AND THE MOZAMBIQUE GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR PART HAD SIGNALLED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE A MORE OPEN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA AND TO ACCEPT SOUTH AFRICAN PRIVATE INVESTMENT. THE PORTUGUESE HAD PASSED THIS ON THE AMERICANS BUT UNFORTUNATELY THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST. FUTSCHER PEREIRA SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICAN STATEMENTS HAD MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ANGOLANS TO ACCEPT CUTAN WITHDRAWAL SI ULTANEOUSLY WITH A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. PAOLO JORGE HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD PUBLISH A TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AS SOON AS A NAMIBIA AGREEMENT WAS INITIALLED. FUTSCHER PEREIRA HAD PRESSED HIM TO OFFER A PARTIAL CUBAM WITHDRAWAL AT THAT STAGE, AND JORGE HAD NOT REJECTED THE IDEA. HE HAD WRITTEN SUBSEQUENTLY BOTH TO JORGE AND TO HAIG TO FOLLOW UP THIS SUGGESTION. THE APPARENT CONJUNCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND SWAPO FLEXIBILITY PUST BE EXPLOITED NOW.