TNAG-1171-FCO40-1452-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 68

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Mr ThomGDN

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FUTURE OF HONG KONG,

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FEH 0.40./.1.

Reference

liberating idea but it would come a crisis of confidence I implemented.

2vis too weak.

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285

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elmu for comput forward sovereignty/ 1. With the 'Macao-Solution' (ie straightforward sovereignty/ administration deal) for Hong Kong's 1997 problem looking increasingly unlikely to win Chinese approval, I wonder whether we should examine more closely another option. I have sketched out on the attachment a rather complicated joint statement which I think the Chinese might be able to accept, enabling us to take the domestic legal steps to remove the 1997 cut-off date for the Governor's powers of administration in the New Territories.

See (288

2. The main point about the attached draft is that it is a specifically temporary arrangement, with both sides reserving their positions on sovereignty. The ultimate solution is left for the future. Nonetheless it would have several attractions for the Chinese:

3.

(280

(a) HMG formally accepts that the old Treaties were Unequal (cf China's demand that the USSR acknowledges the inequality of the old Tasarist Treaties);

J (b) HMG formally accepts that Hong Kong's future must be

considered as a whole (ie not just New Territories);

(c) HMG formally accepts possibility of rendition of whole Territory before 1997 if the PRC and 'people of Hong Kong want it:

manoeuvre.

(d) No new restraint is placed on China's future freedom of (The fact that we agree to voluntary withdrawal in certain circumstances would not affect the Chinese ability in practice to force our withdrawal at any time she chose.)

(e) HMG agrees immediately to fly the PRC flag alongside the Union flag and to accept a Chinese Resident.

The draft takes note (eg in the mixture of joint and parallel statements) of my view that for the Chinese the problem has two aspects;

•

4.

(a)

International: UK/China relations

the need to agree to

timing and manner,

annul the old Treaties;

(b) Domestic: Chinese reunification internal matters; UK has no locus and Chinese will sign no agreement with us tying their hand.

From our point of view we would give away little of substance. The Chinese would in practice still be able to wreck Hong Kong's stability etc any any time. But we might be able to get off the legal hook of 1997 and thus be able to consider in a calmer atmosphere the long-term Future and ways of maintaining confidence in the meantime.

5.

I do not think it will be easy to get such an agreement. We shall have to negotiate toughly (I also have some ideas on the cards we can play!) We may have to make an additional secret

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/agreement