Mr Thogany
in Elliott M. 46
On
a
SECRET
plebiscite, the latention is a polite fiction, implying that China might just develop so rapidly in the next few years that a majority of HK people usd vote for reunification before 1997. In practice there darge of the Chinese asking for a plebiscite unless they were quite confident of a massive majority in their favow. l.e. in practice there we never be a pubiscite.
wd be
2. On confidence, I agree with ther Clift that my ideas would leave
Considerable uncertainty about the timing of any eventual takeove. But there is uncertainty at present and Hong Kong survives, so uncertainty is not ipso facto disastrous.
I have suggested to Mr Williamson that we shd look more closely at ways of holding confidence after the 'Shock!
3.
A
We should certainly try an very doubtful that we
lice Sir P Cradock,
gecerous notice clause would obviously be very valuable (I am not clear whether HKGD also regard it as an essential part at the proposed sovereignty | administration deal) for this during the negotiations. But, I can persuade the Chiese to tie their hands in this way, even for say 10-15 years; they would see this as a derogation of their sovereignty. at present they have a right (in their new) to resume HKC at any time and in practice they can have the lot in 1997 by sitting on their hands. And, as My McLaren has pointed out, what would we do when the Cherese gave notice? Ow position would be intolerable.
Flag B
I shall continue to reflect!
rox
2/vi..
1. The prossel for a notre classe assumes that the Chinese too are concerned about confidence and to meet this concern would be
Inhoud to accept a limbet derogatur of
them
sovereignty
If they gave
novée ou portan
position at seems
ti
me
I would le
diffranits but not intolerate = containing less intolerable than II- sevld be if i driftent lowraly 1997 uthub sume
hand of understanding PT.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.