TNAG-1168-FCO40-1448-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 90

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Future of Hong Kong

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04011 (272)

1981

1. When you agreed to the ideas in my minute of 15 December 1981 about your visit to China, Hong Kong and Japan and about Hong Kong's future, you asked for further thoughts after Humphrey Atkins'

visit to Peking.

See (110 2. One of the purposes of this visit was to establish whether there had been any shifts in Chinese thinking since we last tackled them. From the conversations Humphrey Atkins had with Premier Zhao and Vice Premier Ji, it is clear that while the Chinese have not moved on essentials, they recognise the existence of the problem as well as the need for it to be solved before 1997. have said they want to see Hong Kong remain a free port and a commercial and financial centre. They have also said that in due course they would discuss with us taking local Hong Kong opinion (249 into account.

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3. In many ways the line taken by the Chinese is encouraging. They are clearly thinking about the problem more urgently than before. They have hoisted aboard the need to preserve confidence

However, and the importance of Hong Kong's economic autonomy.

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237

do not myself believe that they have yet fully grasped the ways in which confidence could be threatened or maintained. The emphasis by the Chinese Premier, Zhao Ziyang, on the importance of the Taiwan analogy (Peking telno 18) is encouraging in that the Chinese (in their '9-point proposals issued in the autumn) clearly recognise that Taiwan would need to be accorded a great deal of economic and political independence. However, it is possible that the Chinese have in mind a solution for Hong Kong which excludes continuing British administration.

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