TNAG-1167-FCO40-1447-Future-of-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 154

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DSR 11C

F)

Not

effect. But lacks long-term credibility unless coupled

with arrangements for administration after 1997.

sufficient to halt slide of confidence.

Unilateral action by HMG to remove the limit in the 189 Order in Council on powers of administration in the New

Territories; Chinese acquiescence.

(i)

Likelihood. Part of the rejected 1979 proposals

They

Chinese acquiescence would need to be obvious.

are not likely to acquiesce if (as seems possible) they

think that any such change should be coupled with

concessions on sovereignty.

solution similar to (C).

(ii)

Would therefore lead to

Problems for HMG.

As in (C) (ii) above.

(iii) Effect. As in (C) (iii) above.

Conclusion

12

Stronger verbal assurances from the Chinese (option A

would not by themselves have a significant effect on

confidence in Hong Kong; and neither would a statement

that 1997 had no relevance (B), unless it opened the way

to action by HMG on the continuation of administrative

powers. Measures to solve the land lease problem with

Chinese consent (E), would be only of short-term effect.

Option (D), providing a period of warning before any change were made in the status of Hong Kong, is marginally

A public the most attractice from the UK point of view.

agreement that the treaties on Hong Kong were not applicable but that British administration could continue

beyond 1997 .. (C) would also be satisfactory.

possibility is (F)

A third

removal, with Chinese agreement, of

the limit in the 1898 Order in Council to our administrati

in the New Territories beyond 1997.

These three would

/almost

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