CONFIDENTIAL
04011
Hier NIVO CHAT NO. 51 10 FEB 1982
GA 400
CONFIDENTIAL
FM SINGAPORE 391223Z FEB 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
FTELNO 37 OF 9 FEBRUARY
INFO JAKARTA, MANILA, BANGKOK, KUALA LUMPUR, PEKING, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, HONG KONG.
FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISITI TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND SECOND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
1. TALKS WITH DHANABALAN LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND THREE QUARTERSAWD WERE JOINED FOR THE FINAL HALF HOUR BY RAJARATNAM. MUCH OF LATTER PERIOD WAS DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET POLICY WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SOUTH EAST ASIA, POLAND AND THE MIDDLE EAST. RAJARATNAM BLUNTLY DESCRIBED THE SOVIET UNION AS THE ENEMY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, PREDICTED THAT THE SOVIET EMPIRE WOULD CRUMBLE FROM WITHIN BUT ADDED THAT AN EXTERNAL DEFEAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO SET THIS PROCESS
IN TRAIN. CAMBODIA MIGHT PROVE TO BE THE PLACE.
2.
MAIN PART OF DISCUSSION WITH DHANABALAN CONCERNED CAMBODIA/VIETNAM ON WHICH PNEASE SEE MIFT (NOT TO HONG KONG). OTHER POINTS WORTH RECORDING ARE,
*
1. HONG KONG: LORD CARRINGTON DESCRIBED THE PROBLEM OF
INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND THE LEGAL DIFFICULTIES. HE WAS SURE THAT THE CHINESE WOULD INSIST ON FORMAL SOVEREIGNTY, BUT HE WAS NOT SURE HOW FAR THEY APPRECIATED THAT THE USEFULNESS OF HONG KONG TO THEM DEPENDED ON ITS ''FOREIGNNESS’’. IF CONFIDENCE EVAPORATED IT WOULD HURT THE CHINESE MORE THAN US, BUT THEY NEVERTHELESS SEEMED TO THINK THAT IT WAS UP TO US TO PRODUCE THE IDEAS.
DH ACABALAN NOTED THE PROBLEM BUT HAD NO IDEAS TO OFFER.
11. BRUNEI: THE QUESTION WAS RAISED BY DHANABALAN WHO SAID
THAT SINGAPORE WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO HELP IN THE RUN UP TO INDEPENDENCE.
CONFIDENTIAL
Redacted under FOI exemption sections 27 (1), (2)
/SULTAN
55
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