TNAG-1162-FCO40-1442-Visit-by-Margaret-Thatcher--UK-Prime-Minister--to-Hong-Kong--1982 — Page 6

Dr

Darid

Other

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Foreign Affairs

4 NOVEMBER 1982

I shall not go right round the world. Two long speeches have already been made. However, I shall mention three or four small issues. The first is sovereignty. I know the difficulty with the present Prime Minister. I urge the Foreign Secretary not to get the Falkland Islands issue hung up on sovereignty. The House was very nearly united at various stages in its determination to resist aggression. That is why we agreed and why there was a great deal of support for the Government's action in the Falkland Islands.

I believe that the United Nations was foolish to have had this debate in the General Assembly. The resolution was at the wrong time and was made in the wrong place. It should have gone to the Security Council, not to the General Assembly. We should not get into a flap about the United States. It paid a heavy price for giving us unequivocal support when it mattered, which was during the war in the Falklands. Any Government would say "This is not the right time to open negotiations. We have barely buried our dead. The wounds are still not healed, both metaphorically and physically." There is no doubt that we shall have to build up trust and understanding with the Falkland Islanders before we go into negotiations.

What has been missing in the United Nations is any clear statement from the British Government that in the fullness of time they will enter into negotiations. That is what we should have. That is what must come out of the debate. All hon. Members know that there will have to be negotiations over the Falkland Islands. We are not prepared to be pushed into them by General Assembly resolutions. We shall do so in the fullness of time and at the right time. Let us have no nonsense about the fact that we will do so.

The Prime Minister's visit to Hong Kong was disastrous. She should never have gone to China. She had made so many commitments on sovereignty and self- determination that she could not grapple with the issue as sensitively as was required.

All I can say to the Foreign Secretary is that he should keep the Prime Minister well away from those issues now. He should take them into his own hands. I say to him in great friendliness that if Sir Anthony Parsons is to accompany him, he could not get a better person. The Prime Minister must not be allowed near Hong Kong. That is the almost unanimous view of the 5 million people who live in Hong Kong. This is a resolvable problem on which action must be taken.

I shall mention two other major areas. The first is Namibia. It is regrettable that the contact group of the five countries did not tell South Africa when it came to it for a loan from the IMF that it was practising not just institutional apartheid but economic apartheid. It should have said that South Africa cannot continue to do this and ask it to agree in the IMF that it should have financial support. There is merit in the IMF not having too great a political involvement in its financial decisions. That is one of the reasons why the IMF has lasted as long as it has. It has been broadly insulated from that.

But South Africa must be told clearly that Namibia is a test case and that no obstacle can legitimately be placed in the way of UNTAG supervising independent elections there. The South Africans should have been told that before the IMF loan was given. From now on they should be told that there will be no subsequent support from the

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IMF while they continue to block progress on Namibia. There is distinction between sanction for independence in Zimbabwe, Namibia-

Mr. Robert Hughes (Aberdeen, North): Too late.

Dr. Owen: I do not think that it is too late. I still believe that Namibia can come into independence.

Mr. Hughes: I was saying not that it was too late for independence for Namibia, but that it was too late for the IMF to attach conditions to the loan in relation to Namibia.

Dr. Owen: I apologise for misrepresenting the hon. Gentleman. I made representations to the Foreign Secretary about the matter. I have little hope that there will be a change now, but I suspect that, given the problems that confront the South African economy, it will be back for more. It should be made clear to the South Africans that there will be no more IMF support while they are blocking progress in Namibia. I know that the Foreign Secretary is prepared to say that it is South Africa that is currently blocking progress in Namibia.

I have been somewhat critical of some United States policy in the past. Nevertheless, I pay tribute to President Reagan's courage in putting a multilateral force into Lebanon. We would not even be in the present uneasy circumstances if that force were not there. I also pay tribute to George Shultz. I have far more confidence in him as Secretary of State than I have had in the United States Administration's policy of the past few years.

I give the Foreign Secretary a word of caution about the Middle East. Since they have been in office, the Government have managed to lose influence in Israel. That is dangerous. It is possible to be a candid friend of Israel while criticising her, as President Mitterrand has shown. He still has a dialogue with Israel. I regret some of the statements that even the Foreign Secretary has made on the issue.

To talk about a Palestinian State without qualifying the circumstances in which a Palestinian State is possible only fuels those who have an unrealistic view of what a Palestinian State should be. I do not object to the wording, but I tried to restrain the Foreign Secretary on this matter at Question Time recently.

In any serious negotiations, a Palestinian State would have to be demilitarised. It is unrealistic to propose a Palestinian State on the West Bank that has the missiles and weaponry of modern warfare. That is one of the reasons why President Reagan was right to state that a link-some federation-between the West Bank and Jordan might be the right solution. He said that that was his favoured position, not the only possible one. In that case, the new State would be armed. It is difficult to expect people to accept a State, the territory of which is totally demilitarised. That is one of the real problems that must be faced. The Americans are right to state that that is their preference, but to admit that a solution must be negotiated.

The PLO should not be made the sole exclusive voice of Palestinian opinion. That UN form of words was a great problem when it was given to SWAPO in Namibia. I am reluctant to give it to any organisation, let alone the PLO. Nevertheless, we must all be anxious to find a way of getting the PLO to negotiate. Without the PLO, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a solution that will stick. Such a solution will require a great deal of skill.