IN CONFIDENCE
2.
oppose).
K
As far as CBF's own role was concerned, he said he had never felt torn between the Governor and the MOD his two effective masters. His reporting officer in London was the Chief of Defence Staff, but he did not have to maintain daily contact with London to receive orders and in his capacity as security adviser to the Governor he had always been able to give forthright and independent advice.
Some particular operational difficulties were described. Internal security training had to be carried out in partly completed buildings. With only one live field-firing range in Hong Kong (Castle Keep), and training space obviously restric- ted, it was sometimes necessary to go overseas to train, mainly to Brunei, on a 2-year cycle. Communications equipment was an area of concern, particularly since the delay in arri- val of Clansman, and the high-rise environment posed problems in this field which had not yet been solved. Sports and recreational facilities were another problem, with the Services having to struggle financially or court local unpopularity to retain what they had. Many sports facilities were shared with civilian clubs. Some Service families found the environment difficult and there was a tendency for the Services to form an isolated community, though one in which inter-Service rivalries were notably few. A Chinese language school met modest Service needs, but the prevalence of spoken English meant that no senior officers tended to learn Chinese. Health and education facilities for Service families were described as reasonable, and the SSAFA service as excellent.
POLMIL
In the afternoon, the Committee visited POLMIL, the administrative centre for internal security cooperation between the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (RHKPF) and the British Forces. Day to day command and control of the policing of the city is exercised at regional POLMILS.
The current strength of RHKPF is 22,000. Their normal role is a constabulary one but, although there have been no major public disorders since the late 1960s, a riot suppres- sion capability has to be retained which can be put into ope- ration at short notice. Although an early warning system enables local disorders to be coped with at platoon level, an emergency force of 9,000 can be quickly formed to confront a major internal security crisis. Armoured personnel vehicles, CS gas and wooden bullets are available for use, with firearms only resorted to in an emergency. Tactical unit training is the key to much of the RHKPFS work, and the use of helicopters is also crucial, illustrating an important field of police/ military cooperation. The introduction of soldiers on to the street is seen as a potentially sensitive course of action and in most routine policing and in dealing with terrorist-type incidents there is no military involvement. Despite being geared for serious public disorders, the RHKPF uses what is basically a community policing system, one that has been copied in several respect by the Japanese police.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.