(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)
9 December 1975]
Mr RJ ANDREW, Mr J M PARKIN, Mr W G MANN, Captain T H BRADBURY, RN, and Group Captain F D G CLARK
hope to improve on that. The three weeks takes account of the reduction in the size of the transport force. It also takes account of the fact that after March of next year we shall no longer have a staging post on Gan and we would probably have to fly west-about rather than east-about to get there; and this involves diplomatic clearance for overflying and so on. But three weeks is very much a worst case. We believe that if all the circumstances were favour- able we could improve on that a good deal.
33. It means that if you wish to rein- force at the time you take the decision, at a time of emergency, you then have to start diplomatic clearance with coun- tries before you can overfly?—Yes.
34. And if they do not give it you cannot reinforce?— I think it is un- likely that the countries one would fly over on the way from the UK to Hong Kong would not give clearance in an emergency.
35. But where is west-about and what countries would you have to negotiate with? I think it would be primarily flying over North America. (Group Captain Clark.) The United States or Canada.
36. But there would be no need to stop anywhere other than North America?No-and the islands in the Pacific chain.
37. In the control, in other words, of a NATO ally, one hopes?· -Yes.
Chairman
38. Turning to the Navy, what arrange- ments are you thinking of making for protecting British shipping and for search and rescue in the seas around Hong Kong after the frigate has been withdrawn?- (Mr Andrew.) It will, I fear, mean a reduction in Naval capa- bility when the frigate goes, although I think one has to recognise that in Hong Kong it is not possible even now to have one frigate permanently on station. In so far as a vessel larger than a patrol craft is required, we should be depen- dent on visiting Royal Naval ships. Of course, for rescue tasks we would have
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the patrol craft and helicopters from Hong Kong, but there will be a diminu- tion in our capability in this respect.
39. They are very good patrol craft and give plenty of opportunities to young commanders, which is excellent, but they are not really anything like so efficient, for example, in really rough weather like typhoons and so on. I think that is a disadvantage? -Yes. There is no doubt that, had we been able to do so, both we and the Hong Kong Government would have preferred to keep both the frigate and the patrol craft; but once again financial factors played a large part in this decision. The running cost of the Naval element of the garrison at the moment is some- thing like £7.7 million a year, which is a substantial sum. The annual running cost of the proposed new garrison, that is the Naval element without the frigate, will be of the order of £3.3 million a year, so there is a very substantial saving here.
Mr Finsberg
40. We were told that the life of the patrol craft is expected to run out in the early 1980's. We know also that some of the rubber inflatables, the Geminis, have a habit of going "US" fairly fre- quently. Has thought been given to replacing the Geminis with something more reliable and are there any plans in train for replacing the patrol craft by a more modern vessel in the 1980's?- -If I can deal first with the Geminis, we did hear from Hong Kong that this point had come up and we are in the process of producing a paper on the subject, so if I may I will leave that one and we will let the Sub-Committee have paper on that.
Chairman
41. That is very kind of you?—If I can turn to the patrol craft themselves, it is true we expect they should be able to run on until the early 1980's. We have not yet given a great deal of de- tailed consideration to their replace- ment. We recognise it as a problem which will have to be faced and one which will have to be discussed with the Hong Kong Government, who will, of
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.