6
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
9 December 1975] Rt Hon WILLIAM RODGERS, MP, and
Mr RJ ANDREW
not think we would want to see the army used as an alternative to
the police. We do not see that as its role. It is a back-up role in internal security, but I do not think it would be right for the Hong Kong Government to rely upon the Army for what are essentially police duties. (Mr Andrew.) I believe the police force has been considerably in- creased since 1967 when the last riots took place, and we certainly see the Army's role essentially as back-up. We would see the two forces as complemen- tary. There are certain specialised tasks which the police cannot do.
Chairman.] We were briefed twice by the police; once at headquarters and once at the district level and we got this from both of them.
Mr Sandelson
15. I would like to add my con- gratulations to what has been said for what would seem to be an agreement which none of us round this table had thought possible from the talks we had over there. I hope the agreement does go through as the Minister is so clearly
[Continued
hoping. What would the Minister con- sider, in his own words, to be the philosophy behind British retention of military interest in Hong Kong at all? (Rt Hon William Rodgers.) My philosophy I think would be that at the moment there are three parties to an unarticulated understanding. One is London, another is Peking and the third is Hong Kong, and the unarticulated understanding is that the status quo should remain * * * because it is of mutual convenience. In a situation of this kind, if some part of the status quo is unreasonable it will upset the other parties and they may feel it is necessary to look at the situation in a new light,
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Chairman.] We do not want the Minister to go into too much detail. Are there any more questions of major moment? Then it is for me to thank you very much for coming. We think you have a very good agreement. hope it goes well, and I hope that if they are paying a major part of the bill they will not try to demand too much.
Examination of Witnesses
I
Mr RJ ANDREW, Assistant Under Secretary of State (General Staff), Mr J M PARKIN, Assistant Under Secretary of State, AQ (Army Department), Mr W G MANN, Inspectorate of Establishments, Division A, Captain T H BRADBURY, RN, Director of Naval Administrative Planning, and Group Captain F D G CLARK, Assistant Director of Defence Policy, Air, Ministry of Defence, called in and examined.
Chairman
16. I think it would be right to say that we were very impressed with the high quality of the top commanders in Hong Kong, from the General down to the Brigadier. It was said to us that the Gurkha battalion's battery training in Hong Kong would miss very much the armoured squadron and the artillery battery once these have been withdrawn. You did feel it was right to withdraw rather than possibly take a cut? I know this has been done before with the Gurkha battalions, but more in infan- try? (Mr Andrew.) Yes. As we see it, the task in Hong Kong is one which essentially requires infantry troops. The artillery unit and the armoured re- connaissance vehicles were useful there. They were useful for two reasons.
an
Firstly, they had themselves a second- ary internal security role in the same way as we use artillery units, for example, in Northern Ireland in internal security role. They also had a useful training role, in that it was useful for the infantry units of the gar- rison to be able to take part in all-arms training. Having said that, we felt that they had not a direct operational role; and artillery and armoured vehicles are, of course, expensive items and when we were forced to prune the costs of the garrison, as we have now done, we felt these non-infantry units were ones which we could, regretfully, not afford to retain in the garrison.
17. I am quite sure it was very care- fully considered before the decision was taken?—Yes, indeed. If I may say
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.