(DEFENCE AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SUB-COMMITTEE)
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pounds. In the present circumstances, however, it is impossible to give up the ESBA, the territory of which might be claimed by both local communities, and even if there were a communal settlement, we are by no means certain that it would be the Government's intention to rationalise the deployment of forces on the island. *** Within the existing arrangements in Cyprus several major problems remain for the Commander British Forces, Cyprus. First of all, in addition to the commitment of patrolling the perimeter of the SBAS with a reduced garrison, there is the need to maintain the security and safety of facilities, now perhaps unused, within those areas. We have probed the question of protection of Service property not only in the SBAs but also in several retained sites on the island, and we take note of the assurances that police and security forces are adequate to protect essential buildings and equip- ment (see Appendix 17 p 43). We nonetheless register our concern for this problem. A further legacy of the run-down in forces is the need to maintain a very expensive airfield at Akrotiri which is operated now only for the transit of trooping flights and for the Whirlwind helicopters. It is indeed a matter for concern that the airfield formerly the busiest in the RAF will henceforth be open for only a few hours a day. There is also the continued cost of retaining a hospital at Akrotiri and the medical centre at Dhekelia. Once again expensive facilities will be only partially used. * * *
21. We consider that the situation which prevails in British Forces Cyprus is somewhat disturbing. The RAF no longer have a major role although the option is open to reinforce Akrotiri in strength if required. The Army have a commitment to maintain the integrity of ninety-nine square miles with less than two thousand men. The trend of the Government's policy in the Mediterranean would seem to point to a further diminution of the British presence when circumstances permit. Yet this does not fully take account of the strategic value to Western defence which has been attributed to the British presence in Cyprus. It was claimed in evidence that the base at Akrotiri could be reinforced and reactivated in time of tension to make a significant contribution on the southern flank of NATO (Q 69). This assumes that notice would be given so that a timely decision to reinforce could be taken. During this time the airfield and radar installations, currently without air defence of any kind, could be put out of action almost without opposition. Any further reassessment of the present position is obviously difficult in a time of financial stringency and because any changes would to a considerable extent be dependent on a solution of Cyprus community troubles. We view seriously the effective abandonment of the RAF's major role in Cyprus.
22. During their tour, the Sub-Committee spent a day with the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). They held discussions with the UN Force Commander and his staff officers including the Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander British Contingent. The British contribution to UNFICYP has been in the form of logistic support and the extra costs of the UK contingent (ie the costs over and above the normal pay and allowances of the troops and capital and operating costs of their equipment). This amounted to about £3.5 million in 1974-75 and is estimated to cost £3.74 million in 1975-76 (Q 105). The funding of UNFICYP by Member states has lagged behind expenditure and the Government has suspended further cash contributions. Only the United States are contributing more in total value to the United
1 In February 1976, the cost of the UK contribution for 1975-76 was estimated at £4 · 14 millions. 394416
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