TNAG-1154-FCO40-1434-Visits-by-Members-of-Parliament-(MPs)-to-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 162

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THIRD REPORT FROM THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE

it is planned that a further Gurkha battalion should be flown from Brunei to reinforce the garrison and that a further British battalion should be flown out from the United Kingdom. The timely arrival of these reinforcements, particu- larly the Brunei battalion (which would be available much more quickly), would be essential to combat sustained rioting on the scale of the 1967 emergency. We consider that it should be recognised that no further cut in the Hong Kong garrison should be contemplated. We note also that in the reduction of Army units the ratio of British to Gurkha soldiers has altered and only one British battalion is to be stationed in Hong Kong. With the general retrenchment of British Servicemen in the garrison it would no longer be a sufficient token of British commitment to the future of the Colony if there were any further significant reduction of the British element of the garrison.

8. The implications for the Brigade of Gurkhas of the reduction in the strength of the Hong Kong Garrison are very serious. The worldwide Gurkha order of battle currently includes five battalions, three in Hong Kong; one in Brunei and one in the United Kingdom (Q 5). On the assumption that these units are unlikely to be used for any long-term commitments outside their present situation, it is quite clear that Gurkha soldiers will spend the bulk of their service in Hong Kong. In that light, the loss of the armoured squadron and the artillery battery from the Hong Kong garrison has significant con- sequences (Q 16). Inside the Colony during their normal tours of duty it will no longer be possible for Gurkha battalions to train in conjunction with artillery and armour (Q 23). There is a real danger that in time Gurkha soldiers will become operationally fitted solely for internal security purposes and that British officers will no longer find so satisfactory and varied a career in the Gurkhas. Their experience will compare unfavourably with that of their contemporaries in British units. The difficulties which arise from the lack of opportunity for all-arms training are exacerbated by the restriction on the areas in the world in which the Government is prepared to deploy units of the brigade of Gurkhas. We recommend that this restriction should be re- examined. We must warn that there is already a substantial risk that the brigade will fall to such a size that its viability could be questioned. When this is coupled with the limitations on the use of Ghurkhas, doubts may arise about the value of the retention of this economical, highly effective and valuable force. If there is an opportunity to strengthen the British component in the garrison in Hong Kong, the inclusion of an artillery battery, in particular, and an armoured squadron, if possible, would not only give a more balanced force, it would afford to the Gurkhas the possibility of regular training with other arms to which they are surely entitled.

9. As the Headquarters of the Brigade of Gurkhas is in Hong Kong and the Deputy Commander British Forces is Major General Brigade of Gurkhas, our Sub-Committee considered it appropriate to investigate some of the admini- strative problems of the Gurkha Brigade during their visit. Our attention has been drawn to several personnel matters which show that the conditions of service of the Gurkha soldiers, though better than formerly, are still capable of substantial improvement. In general terms, the pay and conditions are laid down by a series of agreements signed in 1947 between the United Kingdom, India and Nepal. Gurkhas in the British Army are paid at the same basic