TNAG-1147-FCO40-1427-UK-policy-towards-South-East-Asia--including-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 81

CONFIDENTIAL

Para 14:

Amend first sentence to read 'Even if the Sino-Soviet dispute were to end or at least to be reduced in intensity (since the prospects of a complete Sino-Soviet rapprochement are remote given deep-rooted mutual distrust, the sharp difference of views on Afghanistan and Cambodia and the Soviet military presence on China's northern borders) there seems little reason to think that Sino-Soviet rivalry in SE Asia would end.'

Para 15:

:

Second sentence: Amend 'suspicion' to 'resentment' and

3 after 'maritime power' insert 'slowly'.

Passim

Peking, not Beijing, please.

12 November 1982

CC:

Mr Donald (WH323A)

Mr Burns (SEAD, W83A)

Mr Broomfield (EESD, W101A)

Mr Clift (HKGD, WH307A)

Miss Marsden (Planning Staff, K115) Mr Beel (Research Dept, G53/3) Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office

CONFIDENTIAL

MarkChick

Mark Elliott

Far Eastern Dept