TNAG-1147-FCO40-1427-UK-policy-towards-South-East-Asia--including-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 77

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7.

Vietnam's essential objectives to consolidate control over

Laos and Cambodia as client states and to keep China at bay.

Her dependence on Soviet Union a function of her bad relations

with China, not of her cool relations with ASEAN (and West).

Cambodia settlement on Vietnam's term would therefore have only

marginal effect on her dependence on Moscow. Vietnam still an

attractive investment for Moscow, though there will be growing

Soviet concern that Vietnam's unwillingness to work towards

modus vivendi within South East Asian countries adds unnecessarily

and unprofitably to the bill.

8. China, under present leadership, likely to pursue cautious

policy towards non-Communist South East Asia, maintaining party

to party links at subsistence level, without being ready to

abandon them altogether.

9.

Japan wants stability in South East Asia for both strategic

and economic reasons. Concerned to keep Malacca Strait under

friendly control. Sees natural complementary relationship with

ASEAN countries as reliable source of raw materials and growing

market for Japanese goods and services.

equivocal.

ASEAN view of Japan

10. ASEAN confused and anxious about US role. Fear post-Vietnam

withdrawal symptoms, plus schizophrenia about China/Taiwan have

led to loss of US ability to be interested in/worry about South

East Asia. Hence ASEAN eagerness to institutionalise 'dialogues'

with other allies EC, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan.

11.

EC-ASEAN dialogue important symbolically, but easier to

declare support and esteem than to give tangible expression to it.

Dialogue unsatisfactory both in form and substance; risk of dis-

appointment not yet acute but growing.

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