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14. There have recently been some indications of a "thaw" in Sino-Soviet relations. Yet even if this dispute were to end or at least to be reduced in intensity (since the prospects of a complete Sino-Soviet rapprochement are remote, given the deep-rooted mutual distrust, the sharp difference of views on Afghanistan and Cambodia and the Soviet military presence on China's northern borders) there seems little reason to think
that Sino-Soviet rivalry in S E Asia would end. The Soviet
Union is unlikely to give up her present naval and military presence in the area. The only way the Russians could be forced
to retire would be if the Vietnamese ordered them out of Cam
Ranh Bay, Danang and Kompong Som. On the face of it this seems a remote possibility.
15. The Soviet presence in S E Asia has therefore become a fact
of life for the foreseeable future. It has already been greeted with great resentment in Peking and this suspicion is likely to increase as Chinese maritime power slowly grows and as unresolved disputes (eg the Paracels and Spratlys, territorial waters, economic zones) continue to fester. For these reasons, if for no other, the Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in S E Asia is likely to grow.
ASIAN REGION
NOVEMBER 1982
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
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