TNAG-1147-FCO40-1427-UK-policy-towards-South-East-Asia--including-Hong-Kong-1982 — Page 142

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SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN S E ASIA

1.

The competition for influence in the countries of S E Asia between China and the USSR is, historically speaking, of fairly recent date. It is primarily a by-product of the Sino-Soviet quarrel which began in the late fifties, reached the point of

armed frontier clashes in 1969 and has continued to simmer ever since.

The Soviet Background

2.

The dispute did not have an immediate relevance for Soviet policy in SE Asia for several reasons. One was that for the Russians the region was distant and there were few historical links

or over-riding interests. Moreover, although they supported the struggle of the Vietnamese Communists against the French and subsequently the Americans, they were careful to avoid an outright confrontation with the West by too direct an involvement themselves. The need for Communist solidarity during the Vietnam Wars was, at least at first, an added reason for the Russians not to give practical expression within the region to their mistrust of China.

3.

Two developments changed the Soviet attitude. First, the emergence of Soviet naval power on a global scale in the 1960s and, more particularly, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, meant that S E Asia, lying athwart the sea-lanes from Eastern Siberia, was bound henceforth to play a more important role in Moscow's strategic considerations. Secondly, the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 signalled the retreat of American power from mainland SE Asia, leaving a great-power vacuum which it was tempting to fill. The opportunity for a more direct Soviet presence came in 1978 as a result of Soviet support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia.

The Chinese Background

4.

In contrast to the Soviet Union, China's interest in S E Asia is of venerable duration, not least for reasons of proximity. In the past many of the mainland peoples (Thais, Burmese, Khmers and Vietnamese) paid tribute to the Chinese Emperor. In the 19th and

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