TNAG-1143-FCO40-1423-Hong-Kong-and-the-Falkland-Islands-crisis-1982 — Page 123

Mr Donald

Hier

020/2

CONFIDENTIAL

77

Mr Mallaby, Planning Staff

૮૧૪

No

29/6

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FALKLANDS CRISIS: HONG KONG

1.

Parlo

I have the following comments on paragraph 9 of the draft attached to Mr Mallaby's minute of 21 June:

a) Sentence 4: Reword:

'Although Hong Kong is in practice indefensible against a determined Chinese attack, there is no military threat from the present Chinese régime. China maintains that

time is ripe!'

•

b) After sentence 5

1

•

insert new sentence:

administration of Hong Kong'

'The hard line in Chinese comment on the Falklands has clearly been made with an eye to the implications for Hong Kong.

c) Re-write last sentence as follows:

'Public opinion may harden in favour of retaining

sovereignty in Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, failing to see that this would be both politically and practically out of the question; there may also be pressure for undertakings by HMG to consult the people of the Territory about the future.'

d) Add new last sentence:

'Opinion in Hong Kong itself, may also be affected; people there will note HMG's firm defence of the Falklands and, while not expecting equivalent military action, will lobby for a firm political line. In the short-term at least, this tendency will be increased by the fact that Hong Kong seamen were involved in the Task Force operation and that 6 of them were killed.'

23 June 1982

cc Mr Elliott FED

rown

R D Clift

Hong Kong and General Department

CONFIDENTIAL