TNAG-1143-FCO40-1423-Hong-Kong-and-the-Falkland-Islands-crisis-1982 — Page 11

From:

117

CONFIDENTIAL

M Haworth, CFS Co-ord(N)/A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 7914 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000

(Switchboard)

M.B.ton

енер

Pl. consider int prenos papers,

+ draft. T/L to HIC

T9/1

Richard Hoare, Esq

Hong Kong Dept

FCO

Premous comegenden:

Your reference

Our reference

D/CFS Co-ord(N)/45/12/3

Date

8 November 1982

нки огон

Dear Richard,

HONG KONG CHINESE IN RFA SERVICE

تلى

See also(65

~

метров

12/11

Plus 15/11

1. I mentioned to you on the telephone that we were preparing a paper for consideration by the Admiralty Board recommending the phased withdrawal of Chinese crews from Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Service. I agreed to write to let you know what is proposed.

1~1

2. You will know that considerable difficulties were caused during the Falklands crisis by the general attitude of Hong Kong Chinese crews aboard RFAS (the 6 LSLS ps STROMNESS, PEARLEAF and PLUMLEAF) and a decision had to be taken in the heat of the battle, as it were, to implement a full changeover to UK crews. This was on 11 June and 3 days later the Argentinians surrendered, causing the changeover to be halted. Your Department was kept informed of these developments and was aware of the planned changeover. The Governor in Hong Kong was also briefed, certainly by CBF/CAPIC and presumably by your own people as well, and my understanding is that it became accepted in HKG circles that in view of the difficulties in the Falklands the phasing out of HKC crews was inevitable sooner or later. What we are now seeking from the Admiralty Board is formal endorsement of the decision that was taken in June.

3. It is fully acknowledged here that the HKC found themselves in difficult and at times very dangerous circumstances in a conflict which was hardly "close to home " for them. They are nonetheless aware when they join of the role of the RFA in close support of the Fleet in peace and war, albeit that the peacetime role of the LSLS is somewhat different, being mainly engaged in troop and equipment freighting for the Army across the Channel. The consensus of opinion amongst the Masters of the RFAS in the South Atlantic was that the Chinese crews were liable to panic, displayed insufficient resolve and often had to be driven to do more than the bare minimum work required. They also could not be relied upon to apply their full energies to limiting battle damage once hit, thereby endangering them- ande) | selves and others. I am sure there were notable exceptions to this general BEM picture, but the plain fact is that it would be unwise to plan on Chinese crews as

a whole behaving differently in any future conflict. As it is not practicable to plan on replacing HKC crews at the outset of an emergency, we reluctantly conclude

31.2

CONFIDENTIAL