63.
66
From the analysis above, it can be seen that from the inception until the targetting of MacLennan, the
at no stage had the opportunity to exercise any discretion to "select" targets from its pool of suspects. The Unit all along had been acting on the five files which related to active procurers and credible leads which emerged from time to time. As far as the follow-up of credible leads was concerned, priorities were given to recent homosexual activities only. It will be useful if I quote Ross' evidence in this regard:—'
18
"The limitations on the manpower available precluded, at that stage, going back into what we might call 'old' information. There were active rings operating; therefore the SIU had to concentrate the strength that they had upon these active rings, rather than research... Now in investigating the procurers, of course, many, many names might come to our knowledge; and if they appeared to be active, and if there was corroboration, then an investigation would be commenced into them within the limitations of the manpower available for the task."
64. Ross also explained that certain apparently more "deserving" cases (in terms of the positions held by the suspects, the weight of the evidence and the severity of the alleged offences) were not pursued was because the intelligence against them consisted of stale information, some of which even dated back to 1966. For example, there was a file kept by the SIU containing information of 18 police officers suspected of homosexuality. This file was compiled by the SIU for use by the Personnel Branch in vetting officers ready for promotion, and not with a view to eventual prosecution. Information contained in this file was in some instances listed as "confirmed”, sometimes "unconfirmed”. Some of these named had either left Hong Kong or were alleged to have been involved in homosexual conduct some years previously. Such information was therefore “dated”. In some other cases information was tenuous to say the least. In the light of the shortage of manpower in the SIU, no investigations into these officers were conducted, though Mr. Moor said that in time, when circumstances permitted, he would "move on" some of them.19
65.
I accept what Ross and Moor said.
I.
66.
67.
IMMUNITY—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS20
Brooks and Quinn had difficulty in obtaining information about procurers.
It became apparent that having regard to the circumstances surrounding the commission of homosexual offences and in order to obtain evidence against procurers, it would be necessary to obtain evidence from their clients, or the boys whom the procurers had used. As both clients and procurers committed homosexual offences, it is obvious that it would be extremely difficult to get such people to give statements to the Police if they felt that co-operation might lead to their own prosecution. Accordingly, a procedure was adopted whereby the DPP, upon receipt from the Police of available evidence, would consider and assess the evidence and when necessary grant an immunity to witnesses willing to testify against procurers. This procedure was set out in paragraph 4 of a Report by Quinn dated the 9 February 1979, reproduced, in part, as follows, and which Mr. Justice Macdougall confirmed was a fair representation of his decision as
DPP:-
"(a) Police should make it clear to the potential witness and/or his Solicitor that they were not in any position to grant
immunity and it was the prerogative of the DPP/AG.
(b) Police should then invite the said witness to compile a Statement containing his entire knowledge of the issues the Police require and that the Police should then submit this Statement along with any other relative Statements to the DPP with their recommendations.
(c)
The DPP having satisfied himself that the Statement was honest and complete in content, would grant immunity to the witness, should he have incriminated himself with the content of the Statement."
It was implicit that no potential witness would be prosecuted on the sole basis of a statement made by him where that statement had been elicited from him on the understanding that the Police were seeking information from him as to the activities of procurers and abusers of youth. For the DPP's direction of 28 December 1978 in full see Appendix 18.
68. It would appear that even after the Government House meeting the general direction by the DPP on immunity to persons who could give information about procurers still applied.
J. THE DUFFY IMMUNITY21
69. As this Commission's inquiries proceeded, it became clear that this incident was only marginally relevant to the Terms of Reference, in that it was nothing more than an illustration to show the control Moor and Clancy exercised over the SIU. It must however be stressed that the illustration relates to one instance only and does not represent the general picture. For this reason, though the Commission's investigation in this incident had been extensive and protracted, it merits only a brief mention in this Report. On 19 June 1979, Mr. Duffy was interviewed by Chief
18 See Ross' evidence at Transcript pages 8718-8719.
19
See Moor's evidence at Transcript page 10807.
20 This section is based mainly on the evidence of Mr. Justice Macdougall and Chief Inspector Quinn.
21
This section is based chiefly on the evidence of Clancy, Moor, Quinn and Ross.
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