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intended as he undoubtedly was and right as he undoubtedly was in taking the welfare of MacLennan into account, committed an error of judgment in this instance in exercising his discretion in MacLennan's favour. In the circumstances the error was understandable and could be forgiven. That the knowledge which Trotman imparted to MacLennan might have provided, in part, the motivation for MacLennan to kill himself, is not relevant, and Trotman should not be judged
on this account.
(c) Trotman's actions at scene
152.
When Trotman arrived at Flat 410B on the morning of 15 January 1980, his state of knowledge was as follows.
153. He knew that SIU was coming to arrest MacLennan and that MacLennan knew that he was to be interviewed by that Unit. He must have guessed that MacLennan (having instructed a lawyer and expecting to face possible charges) was clearly trying to evade or at least delay facing his accusers by not appearing in Trotman's office as arranged.
154. With this knowledge, when the main door was broken down and entry was gained into the flat, Trotman would no doubt have more than a suspicious that something was wrong. When Trotman found the suicide note, he recognized that it was in MacLennan's hand. He would clearly be in a state of some anxiety. Indeed, in his evidence, he said: "I drew Mr. Quinn's intention to this (the note) and there was no doubt in my mind that at that time something serious or something that happened of which a serious view should be taken”.35 With his undoubted concern for MacLennan's welfare, it is only fair that I should state that Trotman remained calm and completely professional. He checked the kitchen and the bathroom, and the windows therein to ensure that they were secure. He looked around the living room and found no signs of struggle and noted the same in his notebook. He directed the photographer to take a series of photographs which showed the note, the living room and the door with its locks.
155. When the bedroom door was opened, and MacLennan was found dead, with five bullet wounds in his body, Trotman felt distressed. Indeed, Quinn too was distressed. Despite his feelings, Trotman examined both the body and the room for signs of struggle, then made an entry into his notebook, with a sketch of the body, the positions of the holes thereon, the position of the bed and the revolver.
156.
Trotman then left the bedroom and went to Shaw's flat next door to telephone the District Commander and briefed him on what had happened. He also telephoned District Command Control to arrange for the attendance of Pathologists and Ballistics Officers, and an ambulance and Police Constables for security purposes. He then returned to the flat, made a check of all the windows both in the bedroom and the living room, and inspected the bathroom and the kitchen again. He was then informed that MacLennan had drawn the gun that morning. Within the first half hour of Trotman's entry into the flat but before the arrival of the Pathologists and the Ballistics Officers, he came to the conclusion that it was a case of suicide. At page 10, paragraph 9 of his Report, Mr. Li commented as follows:-
"The classification of suicide, though justified, was reached too early. This resulted in some investigators' steps to eliminate other possibilities not being taken."
157.
It is always a question of judgment for an Investigating Officer as to when he should change his mental approach to an investigation. Initially, Trotman, as he said in evidence, must have kept an open mind, but having eliminated the possibility of an assailant having been in the flat and seeing no signs of struggle in the flat itself and on the body, I do not believe that he could be criticized for coming to a tentative conclusion that this was a case of suicide. That Trotman only took a tentative view was clear from the fact that he did call for Ballistics Officers and Pathologists to attend the scene, knowing as he must have done that the evidence which he observed was purely circumstantial and must be confirmed by further investigations. The question is, whether Trotman had gone far enough in ordering the tests to ascertain whether it was suicide or to eliminate other possibilities. Li, in paragraph 6 of page 8 of his Report, listed a number of things which ought to have been done but were not done. Specifically, insofar as they applied to the time when Trofman was at the scene, they were as follows:-
158.
(i) a fingerprint search was not thoroughly carried out to eliminate other possibilities;
(ii) the services of Chemists were not considered;
(iii) the hands of the deceased were not examined for gunpowder residue to establish that MacLennan had in fact
fired the weapon; and
(iv) the suicide note was not examined for fingerprints.
Trotman accepted that he had left the fingerprint search to the fingerprint officer, thinking that the latter would exercise his initiative. He had considered, but decided against, calling in Chemists since he had sufficient information which pointed to suicide. He considered that the evidence of the Ballistics Officers and Pathologists would
35
See Trotman's evidence at Transcript page 9639.
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