riod of twenty-four years, according to the internal the years after the Libera- 1960. It picked up again vests and the failure of the until 1966 and the bloody w years it was back to a 0 in 1969; and 8,000 in
r before refugees had been
1971 the figure was up to ummer of 1972 they were highest level since 1962. imate, and they represent thousand Chinese, whereas German emigrants in the tively. But the numbers are mild illness or a sign of
blish that this movement of radition. For the inhabitants hem-Hong Kong and the ey are simply an extension of Opium War. Back in ancient ulated villages of the Three Kowloon peninsula in their d there as a kind of security, 11 sending money home. The wangtung province is hit by ople is to move to the British Cantonese origin, rather than rstood and where they have
g Kong. Most of the refugees take who are already in the crown colony obtained by multiplying by five the by the British police.
The Fugitives of Hong Kong and Macao
341
Is Snow's argument wholly convincing? This is not immigration, but a dangerous flight. Why is there this permanent influx which, instead of slackening, has grown since the disturbances of the Cultural Revolution died down? The refugees no longer die of famine; indeed, more often than not they are not even undernourished. If they are hungry when they arrive, it is because they have been waiting for at least a day for the right moment to try to get across the border. Ideology does not seem to be the reason for the flight any more than malnutrition. They have no belief other than communism. Only rarely do they have anything critical to say about Chairman Mao. None of them try to get to Taiwan; none of them are interested in Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang tries hard to win them over through its emissaries, but they resist. So, what is it?
In Peril of Their Lives
Many more try to flee than actually succeed. In May 1962 the com- munist authorities in Kwangtung province suddenly opened the doors to anyone who wanted to go to Hong Kong. The news spread like wildfire. Hordes of immigrants swept into the colony, trampling over the barbed wire and completely overwhelming the British border guards. About seventy thousand refugees arrived in a matter of a few days; eventually, after Whitehall protested to the government in Peking, the flood was stemmed. The majority of the refugees were sent back some days later. The Chinese guards let them through and persuaded them to go back home. Did Peking want to test how many Chinese wanted to leave, or did they want to test how hospitable the Western world would be to the poor, the hungry and the unskilled? Did they want to kill the desire of the people living in the border areas to leave by showing them, once and for all, that "capitalism didn't want them"? Or did they want a temporary solution to the food shortage caused by the bad harvest of 1961, which was felt most savagely in the early spring?
This short, intense hemorrhage was just one rather worrying indication of the desire on the part of many Chinese to leave their country. From this it is reasonable to conclude that millions would immigrate if they could.
This is borne out by another even more significant fact, namely that the government has since adopted the very opposite policy: since 1962 the Chinese authorities have made it virtually impossible to cross the border. Now fugitives risk their lives to reach Hong Kong.
The barbed wire and watchtowers that one sees from the train on the way from Canton to Hong Kong are guarded by troops. Hardly anyone manages to get across; now and again one hears gunshots. Cases have been reported of Chinese getting through by hiding in trucks carrying cabbages or
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